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Abstract
In recent years we have witnessed an increase in the number of two unrelated
phenomena in Canada – collaborative partnerships and First Nations casino development.
This thesis focuses on the integration of these two phenomena by examining the gaming
partnership that the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) and the Province
of Saskatchewan established in 1995. The thesis explores the factors that produced the
partnership, the issues of negotiations that influenced the partnership arrangement, and
the general nature of the partnership’s framework from 1995 to 2002. In analyzing these
aspects of the partnership, the thesis will address its fundamental question – what is the
precise nature of the regulatory framework and its implications for the gaming
partnership in Saskatchewan? This study reveals that there were deficiencies in the nature
of the partnership’s framework, particularly with respect to the accountability provisions
of the partnering arrangement. Those deficiencies created an accountability crisis in the
year 2000, which caused problems both for and between the partners. Eventually,
however, the partners decided to move forward in a relatively positive and constructive
manner towards a sustainable and successful partnering arrangement.
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1Chapter One:
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In 1995, the intergovernmental partnership between the Province of Saskatchewan
and the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) was established as a result of
a two year consultation and negotiation process involving Aboriginal2 leaders and the
Province of Saskatchewan. These negotiations were initiated in response to two
significant Aboriginal gaming issues in the province: sovereignty and socio-economic
development. First, the contentious matter of First Nations3 jurisdiction over gaming on
reserves became a potentially explosive incident on the White Bear reserve in 1993, a
situation requiring immediate mediation by government and Aboriginal leaders. Second,
Aboriginal people experience the highest levels of poverty, unemployment and
incarceration in the province, levels that exceed what are viewed as acceptable in the
non-Aboriginal community. The FSIN and the Province of Saskatchewan therefore
sought to construct an agenda to enhance socio-economic opportunities in the Aboriginal
communities by incorporating a legal and regulated approach to gaming on and off
reserves. Following two years of consultation and negotiation, the FSIN and the Province
agreed upon a partnership arrangement.  Consequently, the 1995 Framework Agreement
was instituted as the intergovernmental partnership’s legal and regulatory framework that
specified the provisions for the responsibilities of actors, casino operations and the profit
sharing formula.
By 2000, the gaming partnership had experienced substantial success in terms of
revenues generated, the numbers of Aboriginal people employed and overall growth of
industry (ie. the development of Aboriginal institutions such as the Saskatchewan Indian
2Gaming Authority). However, in June 2000, allegations of misappropriation of funds at
the corporate level of SIGA precipitated precarious circumstances for the partnership.
The stability and credibility of the partnership was compromised due to the serious nature
of the accountability difficulties. Government opposition, media and the public voiced
grave concerns over the accountability impropriety – and understandably so. Despite the
importance of this partnership in Saskatchewan, in terms of socio-economic development
for the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal community, the research provided on this gaming
partnership is limited. The intent is therefore to amend this lacuna by examining the
fundamental nature of the gaming partnership from its inception in 1995 until the signing
of the twenty five-year partnership agreement in 2002. After all, if deficiencies of the
accountability framework can be determined, we can perhaps better understand what
principal factors are necessary to develop a model for sustainable, and successful
partnerships between Aboriginal governments and other orders of government.
1.2 Objective and Research Questions
The overarching objective of this thesis is to examine fundamental issues related
to the partnership for gaming established in Saskatchewan between the Province of
Saskatchewan (Province) and the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) on
February 10, 1995. More specifically, it examines the genesis, the nature and scope, and
the accountability framework of that partnership from its original 1995 Framework
Agreement to the twenty five-year agreement signed in 2002. The 1995 accountability
framework became a major issue of contention during the course of an investigation into
some financial management practices of the agency established by the FSIN, namely the
3Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA), to develop and operate its casinos. One
of the major issues surrounding that investigation, was which order of government was
responsible for probity in the financial management of funds generated through the
gaming partnership between the FSIN and the Province. This thesis does not focus on the
question of whether the financial management practices were contravened. Instead, it
focuses on the accountability framework of the collaborative partnership. The central
objective of this thesis is to answer four fundamental questions related to the gaming
partnership between the FSIN and the Province:
1. Why did the partnership on gaming develop between the FSIN and the
Province?
2. What was the precise nature and scope of that partnership in 1995?
3. What was the nature of the management and accountability framework of that
partnership prior to the investigation regarding allegations of financial
mismanagement?
4. What changes, if any, were made to the management and accountability
frameworks of that partnership, after the conclusion of the review related to
those allegations of financial mismanagement?
Research on the effects of this partnership on the goals of the FSIN and the Province
of Saskatchewan would be useful. Given that the First Nations casinos have been
operational in Saskatchewan for approximately eight years now, research data would
be available to answer a variety of questions related to their effect. However, such
research is beyond the scope of this thesis.
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives on Partnerships
The objective of this sub-section is to provide some theoretical perspectives on
relationships in partnerships with a special emphasis on accountability in partnerships.
Such perspectives are very useful in understanding the FSIN – Province of Saskatchewan
4gaming partnership. For that purpose a brief review of the key points in the literature
regarding the following matters is provided below: (i) the definition of partnerships; (ii)
the types of partnerships; (iii) the factors that produce partnerships; and, (iv) the factors
that contribute to the quality and the success of partnerships.
(i) Defining Partnerships. The term ‘partnership’ has many different meanings in
different contexts.4 The reason for this is that partnerships are complex and variable
phenomena that do not lend themselves to a single and simple definition.5 However, for
the purpose of this thesis, the ideal partnership is defined as follows:
“a relationship involving the sharing of power, work, support and/or
information with others for the achievement of joint goals and/or mutual
benefits.”6
The term ‘partnership’ has been misconstrued and over-used, and thus for
analytical purposes, it is important to identify those elements that differentiate
partnerships from other organizational relationships. Some of the more distinguishing
elements of a partnership include the following: the partners identify a potential
synergistic relationship; the objectives of a partnership are social in addition to
commercial; the nature of relations are based on “mutuality”7; partnerships typically pass
through the stages of a life cycle, wherein modes of governance and relationships change;
and because partnerships are non-static and dynamic, their processes need to be assessed
and evaluated as they evolve.8
 (ii) Partnership Typology. Partnerships can be categorized according to a range of
characteristics that identify specific dimensions or activities in various types of partnering
arrangements. These broad categories are useful both in categorizing classes of
partnerships and also for understanding a particular partnership arrangement. Partnerships
can be categorized by assessing the following: the power base of the partnership
5arrangement, the purpose of the partnership, the key actors involved in the partnership, the
life stage that the partnership is in, and the ‘implementation mechanisms’ of who does
what, and how in the arrangement.9 The four types of partnerships generally derived from
these sets of characteristics are the collaborative, the operational, the contributory, and the
consultative partnerships.10
The ‘collaborative partnership’ involves power sharing, wherein each partner
foregoes a certain level of autonomy, and thus there are shared decision making processes
involved. In such a partnership the partners aim more towards working together in
performing various roles and responsibilities and there is the tendency for “the pooling of
resources, such as money, information, and labour to meet shared or compatible
objectives,”11 The ‘operational partnership’ refers to those that share work and resources,
but do not share decision-making powers. In most operational partnerships, there is a
substantial level of coordination; however, one partner generally maintains the majority
of control. Many intergovernmental partnerships are of the operational type, wherein the
departments involved maintain jurisdictional authority but emphasize the “harmonization
of action.”12  The ‘contributory partnership’ is not generally considered as a true
partnership, because they do not have operational or decision-making involvement, rather
the support is usually in the form of funding or sponsorship. Lastly, the ‘consultative
partnership’ is one that involves the solicitation of advice from outside of government
such as organizations, groups or individuals, and generally takes the form of advisory
committees or councils.13
These four categories are ideal type models designed to approximate reality, but
they are not perfect models of reality.  In practice the extant partnerships may contain
6elements of two or more of those models. It is possible to have hybrid models that
embrace the various characteristics of all models. Furthermore, partnerships are organic
entities that may therefore evolve from one type to another.14 Thus, it is important to keep
these models in mind to explain transitional or evolving features of any partnership over
time.
(iii) The factors that produce partnerships. The emergence of the partnership
phenomenon in the public sector has been in response to a number of interrelated factors
that influence public sector management. Some of the more notable challenging factors
facing governments include: fiscal restraints, the increased complexity and
interdependence of social issues, an increased demand for greater citizen involvement
and quality program and service delivery, the globalization of economies, and the rapid
advances in information technology.15  As a result of these pressures on public-sector
management, government has introduced some alternative approaches to adapt to
increasing demands including a greater reliance on the use of partnerships.
While the benefits of collaborative partnerships will vary from partnership to
partnership, there are inherent advantages to partnerships that motivate organizations and
governments to initiate them. There is evidence to suggest that collaborative partnerships
are a synergistic means to achieve objectives, resolve conflict and empower
disadvantaged individuals, groups, or organizations.16 Partnerships are particularly useful
in dealing with important matters in times of resource constraints. The reason for this is
that they facilitate the sharing of resources (i.e., financial, infrastructure, skills and
knowledge), they increase levels of participation, they promote shared learning, they
improve effectiveness with a broader base of expertise, they encourage the growth and
7development of institutions, and they foster harmonious relations.17 Effective
partnerships develop relationships that encourage trust, mutual dialogue, commitment,
and cooperation. Benefits occur as the ownership for problem solving processes is shared,
social capital is built through reciprocal relations, and decision-making powers are
diffused amongst partners.
Collaborative partnerships are a synergistic means of achieving various socio-
economic goals that would otherwise be unattainable.  Due to the involvement with a
broad range of organizations, groups and/or individuals, governmental agencies can
interact with several participants to formulate innovative and collaborative approaches for
problem solving.18 This is not to say that governmental agencies can engage in
partnerships without encountering difficult adjustments and potential risks. After all, due
to the need to share decision-making power in partnerships, governmental agencies must
adapt their governance and accountability frameworks as well as their approaches to
planning, policy development, program design, and service delivery.19  One method
available to governments in mitigating the problematic and risky aspects of partnerships
is to be cognizant of the factors that enhance the quality of partnership relations and the
success of partnering throughout its life cycle.
(iv) Factors that influence the quality and success of a partnership. Due to the wide
spectrum of partnerships, and their complexity, identifying the factors that enhance the
degree of success is very difficult. However, it is reasonable to suggest that the quality and
success of a partnership is largely determined by: (a) the overall effectiveness of its
partnering relations, (b) the clarity of goals, responsibilities and expectations of the
partnership, and (c) the nature of the accountability framework. This list of influential
8factors is not exhaustive, but does provide some of the fundamental prerequisites for a
successful partnership which are discussed below.
(a) Partnership relationships. The overall effectiveness of the relationships within a
partnership is a major determinant for the level of quality achieved in that partnership.
Some of the more significant aspects that facilitate the success of a partnership are
dependent upon the following partnering relations - the degree of mutual confidence and
trust amongst the partners, and the level of commitment to cultivate and manage
relationships.20 According to Vangen and Huxham, “if you are seriously concerned to
achieve success in partnership, be prepared to nurture…and nurture…and nurture.”21 The
partners therefore need to develop a strong willingness to work together, to build trust, to
build strong personal relations, to be transparent, and to adapt to unforeseen situations.
Furthermore, partners must demonstrate a tolerance for sharing power, decision making,
and participation and representation in relations of the partnership with other
organizations.22 Due the horizontal structure of power sharing, partnering relations can be
altered positively because adversarial relations are replaced with cooperation and trust,
and partners’ differences are negotiated rather than litigated.23 However, difficulties can
emerge from the high degree of mutual adjustment that is necessary to achieve successful
partnering relationships. For example, if the power relationship amongst partners is not
mutually acceptable, the essential component of trust is damaged, or the process of trust
building is hampered.24
In partnerships, the reality of the situation is that the elements of trust,
interpersonal relationships, communication and mutual understanding have as much
influence on the success of the partnership as funding or institutional features.25 Quality
9partnerships therefore need to incorporate elements that bolster behaviors that facilitate
innovative yet realistic approaches for its relationships. This includes the need to recognize
the implications that differing organizational, management and traditional value systems
have on the partnership. Partnership consultation, for example, may be hindered due to
differing notions on management schemes. This can be an important factor in cases
involving Aboriginal governments or organizations that are inclined to operate on a non-
hierarchical and ‘communitarian orientation,’ partnering with other governments and
organizations that tend to be hierarchical and organizational or even individualistic
orientation.26 Given the different cultural or organizational values and perspectives, it is
essential to develop clear understandings of the ‘other’, promote dialogue, and identify
common interests.
(b) Clarity of objectives, responsibilities and expectations. An important pre-requisite for
successful partnerships involves the construction of a solid relational framework based on
clarity of objectives, responsibilities and expectations among the partners. The
sustainability and level of commitment in a partnership is heightened with a more
formalized agreement that delineates procedures, structures and protocols.27 Included in
this framework should be a clear specification of the overall objectives, roles and
responsibilities of the partners. Furthermore, it is crucial that the partners balance their
expectations with their capacities, which as a result, should help identify the risks involved
in the arrangement.28 The partners also need to determine the precise nature of their
objectives, purpose, values and anticipated outcomes. In addition to identifying agreed
upon principles, the partners need to ensure that planning guidelines, performance
indicators, and evaluation measures are specified and implemented in their arrangements.29
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Achieving objectives and maintaining effective collaborative partnerships is, to a
certain extent, dependent upon the leadership of a partnership. The expectation of the
leadership role is to formulate and realize a vision, while building consensus and working
cooperatively with others to achieve the aims of the partnership.30 For governmental
stakeholders in a partnership it is important that they ensure that their values are respected
and that the interests of their respective communities are protected.  However, assuming
such a leadership role requires sensitivity to a delicate balance of power because the
partnership is more effective and sustainable when a level of mutual dependence and power
sharing is exercised.31 To overcome the potential problems of a dominant partner, it is
useful to institute approaches that help build capacities for the less powerful partner or
partners.32 Building the capacity of partners is beneficial not only for relations between all
partners, but also for the success of the partnership as a whole because each partner can
make a better contribution to the shared tasks.
(c) Accountability framework considerations. Before proceeding with the implications of
accountability aspects to the success of the partnership, it is beneficial here to define the
terms ‘accountability’, ‘responsibility’, and ‘liability’. For the purposes of this thesis the
following conceptualization of ‘shared accountability’ is very useful.
“Shared accountability is a relationship based on the obligation to demonstrate and take
responsibility for performance in the light of agreed expectations. This means that in
intergovernmental partnerships, there are three kinds of accountability relationships:
 accountability amongst the partners;
 accountability between each partner and its own governing body; and
 accountability to the public.”33
Caiden contends that accountability practices are maximized when the elements of
responsibility, accountability and liability are integrated. He defines these key terms as
follows:
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“[T]o be responsible is to have the authority to act, power to control, freedom to decide,
the ability to distinguish (as between right and wrong), and to behave rationally and
reliably and with consistency and trustworthiness in exercising internal judgement.
To be accountable is to answer to one’s responsibilities, to report, to explain, to give
reasons, to respond, to assume obligations, to render a reckoning and to submit to an
outside or external judgement. To be liable is to assume the duty of making good, to
restore, to compensate, and to recompense for wrongdoing or poor judgment.”34
Broadening these definitions with an Aboriginal perspective on accountability and
responsibility, T. Alfred asserts that:
“[a]ccountability in the indigenous sense needs to be understood not just as a set 
of processes but as a relationship….[and] the legitimacy of leaders and of 
governments is determined in part by  the degree to which they adhere to 
accountability procedures, but to an even greater degree by the success leaders 
have in cultivating and maintaining relationships.”35
Partnerships are based on relationships, and may include different organizational cultures,
yet as Pocklington and Pocklington argue there are “remarkable similarities” between the
basic structure of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal political morality.36 Moreover,
partnerships involve the sharing of responsibility, liability and accountability. Therefore,
each partner should be transparent and honest about mutual concerns that have potential to
affect the efficacy of the partnership.37 To strengthen the level responsibility amongst
partners, a formalized accountability framework in a written agreement is essential.
Accountability requirements for an arrangement include explicit stipulations for reporting,
monitoring and evaluation. Because the partnership is non-static process, the partners must
be willing to revisit and if necessary amend the mechanisms instituted for the assessment,
evaluation, and adjustment processes of the arrangement.
Effective communication, which includes representation and participation
in meetings, is important to the reporting and evaluation aspects of accountability
procedures. Moreover, the performance evaluations amongst partners need to address the
actual achievement of objectives, provide feedback on performance results, and permit
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for any necessary adjustments. Instituting these types of implementation practices will
enhance the success of the partnership. The partners must consider accountability
mechanisms as a component of an integrated process. Therefore sufficient information,
ongoing monitoring and credible reporting, partners’ compliance to expectations, and
institutional learning are all necessary mechanisms for partnering arrangements.
Accountability relies heavily upon the reporting and monitoring aspects
between partners. The Auditor General asserts the following preferable features for the
reporting requirements of partnerships: “clear context and strategies, meaningful
performance expectations, results reported against expectations, demonstrated capacity to
learn and adapt, and fair and reliable performance information.”38 As for effective
monitoring strategies, partnerships need to consider the nature of the agreement, the
capacity of the partners, the complexity of the arrangement, the “specific accountability
requirements for each partner” and the level of risk involved in the arrangement.39
The foregoing perspectives drawn from the literature on partnerships are
essential in understanding the various issues related to the FSIN-Saskatchewan gaming
partnership examined in this thesis. In addition to shedding light on the nature and
operation of that partnership, those perspectives will serve as important bases for my
concluding chapter which discusses matters related to the lessons that can be drawn from
the evolution of that particular partnership and ways that it can be improved in the future.
1.4 Value of the Thesis
This thesis will make an important contribution both to understanding and
improving partnerships in Saskatchewan and the literature on partnerships in at least four
13
important ways. First, the analysis of the management and accountability frameworks of
intergovernmental partnerships will contribute to the literature on the topic of developing
Aboriginal-governmental partnering models. For instance, in a collaborative partnership
arrangement Aboriginal organizations and governmental agencies must work together to
formulate frameworks, and implement cooperative strategies for the attainment of
mutually acceptable objectives, and the means by which to attain them. The relationship
must therefore be based upon mutual trust and respect, cooperation, well-defined roles
and responsibilities, established frameworks, and demonstrated commitment. In other
words, harmonious relations are essential for the success of a collaborative partnership.
Second, this thesis should prove useful in revealing the effect that such
intergovernmental partnerships can have for economic development in Saskatchewan,
particularly within the Aboriginal community. It is therefore important to research the
challenges, risks, and successes of the partnership in order to further develop models that
can be applied to potential partnership arrangements. Innovative strategies are important
for economic development in Saskatchewan for both Aboriginal communities and in the
general populace. The theoretical literature on partnerships will be useful as models for
Aboriginal economic development partnerships, of which are fundamental to this thesis.
Third, this thesis will also make a contribution to the expanding body of literature
on various types of intergovernmental partnerships. Although there has been a substantial
increase in research on key dimensions, functions, benefits and risks of partnership
arrangements, much remains to be conceptualized and analyzed. Similarly, although there
has been some attention devoted to accountability frameworks by Robert Behn and Paul
Thomas, who provide an analysis of accountability frameworks within the scope of
14
partnerships undertaken as part of the new public management initiatives, further analysis
is desirable.
Fourth, the analysis of this particular collaborative partnership will make a
contribution to existing literature on partnerships. This study of the gaming partnership
between the Province and the FSIN will provide an additional case study in that body of
literature. More specifically, this particular case study will be useful in increasing the
body of literature on partnerships and accountability in partnerships involving these two
orders of governance, which to date is still relatively limited.
1.4 Methodology
The major methodology used in this thesis is content analysis of various types of
documents.40 This includes primary sources from both the FSIN and the provincial
government such as statutes, annual reports, legislative debates, and agreements. The
thesis also makes extensive use of secondary sources such as newspaper and magazine
articles that devote attention to various developments in the FSIN – Province of
Saskatchewan gaming partnership. Secondary sources derived from journal publications
and books provide the key literature that is necessary to explain the theoretical aspects of
the partnership phenomenon.
1.5 Overview of the Chapters
The thesis consists of five chapters. This first chapter introduces the gaming
partnership between the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) and the
Province of Saskatchewan as an important partnership and as the case study of this thesis.
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The objective of the thesis, the research questions, the value of the thesis, and the
methodology used for this research project is briefly discussed. The chapter also
examines the theoretical perspectives that explain various facets of the partnership
phenomenon. Toward that end, the chapter provides the definition and typology of
partnerships, the motivational factors that produce partnerships, and an analysis of the
principles and propositions of what is likely to contribute to partnerships quality and
success.
Chapter Two examines jurisdictional and regulatory imperatives, and the
economic, social and political factors that were the catalysts for the genesis of the gaming
partnership between the FSIN and the Province of Saskatchewan. The focus and purpose
of Chapter Three is to explore the issues of the 1995 negotiation process, and the nature
of that partnership agreement that ensued. This chapter therefore offers an examination of
the two key documents of the partnership - The 1995 Framework Agreement and The
1995 Casino Operating Agreement. These two agreements are crucial to the partnership
because they prescribe the regulatory, operational, management and accountability
provisions for the arrangement.
The overarching objective of Chapter Four is to address three fundamental
questions. First, what accountability challenges emerged in 2000 from the established
framework of the FSIN – Province of Saskatchewan partnership? Second, what were the
partners’ reactions to these accountability problems, and what implications did these
accountability challenges have for the partnership? Third, how has the agreement
changed from its predecessor as a result of the accountability problems and the
negotiation process; and thus what provisionary reforms were instituted in the 2002
16
agreement? The concluding Chapter Five will provide a summary of the assessment and
analysis of the development, nature and challenges of the FSIN – Province of
Saskatchewan partnership. It will also provide an explanation of some of the valuable
lessons learned in this case study that will be useful for the future of the gaming
partnership, as well as other partnerships.
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Chapter 2:
The Genesis of the Gaming Partnership
2.1. Introduction
The phenomenon of intergovernmental partnerships has proliferated over the past
two decades as an innovative strategy for solving various problems faced by governments
and their respective organizations.41 This includes partnerships between Aboriginal
governments and their federal, provincial and local counterparts. The importance of such
partnerships is underscored by a document of the Department of Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada which states that “[p]artnerships are crucial tools in Aboriginal economic
development.”42 Many such partnerships between Aboriginal governments and their
federal and provincial counterparts are developed as a response to the grim socio-
economic realities found within Aboriginal communities. Such intergovernmental
partnerships are of particular importance in Saskatchewan, where the number of
partnership arrangements between Aboriginal and provincial governments exceed those
in the rest of Canada.43 The gaming partnership established in 1995 between the
Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) and the Province of Saskatchewan, is
an arrangement that was, for the most part, created in response to a highly contentious
jurisdictional issue surrounding gaming activities on reserve.
Despite the potential implications of this issue, and the controversial nature of
gambling activities in general, there has not yet been an attempt to provide an explanation
of the underlying factors that account for the genesis of this important partnership. The
overarching objective in this chapter is to provide such an explanation.
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2.2 Determinants of the Partnership
The gaming partnership between the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations
(FSIN) and the Province of Saskatchewan is largely a product of governmental objectives
and imperatives. More specifically it was a function of three sets of such shared
objectives (i.e., financial, social, and political), and two major sets of imperatives (i.e.,
jurisdictional and regulatory). These are discussed in turn below.
2.2.1 Financial Objectives of the Partnership
Given the demographic profile for the Aboriginal population of Saskatchewan,
and the urgent need to ameliorate the existing socio-economic conditions of Aboriginal
people, the FSIN and the Province of Saskatchewan shared a mutual objective to initiate
an economic development strategy. In light of recognizing sizeable growth in the gaming
industry throughout Canada and the United States, Saskatchewan Aboriginal leaders and
the Province of Saskatchewan envisioned casino development in Saskatchewan as one
enterprise that offered significant financial potential for them that could be redistributed
for the benefit of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities in the province. A
partnership arrangement between the FSIN and Province generated a strategy for shared
Aboriginal economic development aims44, and provided for an equitable allocation of
revenues for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people across the province.45
Prior to the creation of the gaming partnership arrangement, investigations into
tribal gaming in the United States and casino development in Canada were conducted by
FSIN officials and the provincial government.46 Once investigations were completed, the
Province and the FSIN, upon consideration of key financial issues, concluded that casino
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expansion was a viable economic development project in Saskatchewan. As a result of
the studies into gaming, the Province and the FSIN identified three specific financial
factors as indicators that it was prudent to proceed with the development of First Nations
casino operations through a partnership arrangement.
The first financial factor was that the significant outflow of Saskatchewan dollars
spent in the United States on gambling was regarded as an indication that the market for
casino expansion in the province was sustainable, and that these monies should be spent
within the province. In 1993 for instance, it was projected that Saskatchewan citizens,
who were interested in gaming activities, would expend approximately $6.08 million
dollars in the province, as opposed to spending it on gaming activities in the United
States.47 This outflow of Saskatchewan capital captured the attention of elected officials
in the Saskatchewan provincial legislature. In at least one legislative debate, for example,
a government Minister, Eldon Lautermilch, stated “that there was a massive bleeding of
gaming dollars” bound for gambling destinations outside of province that required further
investigation, and the implementation of measures to mitigate this outflow. 48
The second financial factor was the positive effect of gaming establishments for
the levels of economic prosperity, self-sufficiency and sovereignty achieved by certain
Indian tribes in the United States. This tribal gambling experience in the Unites States
served as an important precedent for First Nations in Saskatchewan. To determine the
feasibility of casino development as on-reserve business opportunities, the FSIN
conducted surveys and research in the tribal gambling industry in the United States. 49
The FSIN regarded the American tribal gambling business, which generated $4-6 billion
dollars in revenue in 1994 alone, as a positive indicator that gaming was a viable
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economic development initiative.50 It was also heavily influenced by the multitudes of
tribal-state gaming agreements in the United States. Indeed, by 1995 twenty-three states
in the United States had established tribal-state agreements for the operation of casinos
on 115 reserve lands which collectively were reaping huge revenues for tribal
governments.51 The analysis of the American initiatives was influential on the First
Nations leadership in Saskatchewan because they recognized important parallels between
them, particularly in terms of fostering economic development.52 One noteworthy parallel
is that has gambling provided a feasible financial venture for tribal governments in the
United States because most other financially beneficial ventures were not willing to
locate on reserve lands.53  This was also the case in Saskatchewan where attracting
financial capital for on-reserve business projects has historically proven very difficult and
in some instances impossible.
Moreover, Saskatchewan First Nation leaders articulated the difficulties of raising
financial capital on many occasions. For instance, in 1993 at the Vancouver native
gaming trade show, Saskatchewan Aboriginal entrepreneurs joined their counterparts
from other provinces to voice their frustration at the demonstrated lack of confidence by
Canadian bankers when approached about economic start up costs for gaming business
ventures. Their frustration is reflected in a statement by the chair of the board for the
Bear Claw Casino on White Bear reserve in Saskatchewan, who said at the conference,
“[w]e went to all the financial institutions. We were a joke to them. They wouldn’t touch
us with a 10-foot pole.”54 Similar circumstances encouraged Aboriginal businessmen to
look south of the border, where the American investors offer bands money for casino
operations in exchange for “40% of the take.”55
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The FSIN also became aware through studies that the American tribal gaming
boom facilitated the means for certain tribes to achieve economic self-sufficiency, and
therefore promote nation building and sovereignty. This new tribal business venture in
the United States became an opportunity to transform its political and economic
organization by carving a path for economic prosperity through gambling ventures.56 The
FSIN observed that the gaming industry in the United States represented “a stand for
political independence as tribes assert their sovereignty right to determine for themselves
what they can control on tribal lands”57 - an inspirational precedent for the FSIN.  Tribal
bands in the United States were gaining economic independence that enabled them to
participate in employment and project opportunities that had otherwise been well beyond
the scope of attainment.58
The third financial factor that contributed to the decision to establish casinos was
that the Province and the FSIN realized that gambling activities across the nation were
generating sizable net revenue increases within a relatively short time span. What
convinced both of them of the importance of entering the gaming sector were statistics
indicating that gambling revenues in Canada significantly increased from the early 1980s,
to reach a net profit of $4.6 billion in 1995,59 and casino net revenues in Canada
increased from $15 million in 1990 to $2.6 billion in 1997.60 The Province regarded these
financial data as indicators that casino development could thrive and deliver
advantageous profits for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities throughout
Saskatchewan. The FSIN and the Province therefore viewed casino expansion as a
tremendous opportunity to produce substantial financial revenues provided that
appropriate regulations and provisions were implemented.61
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In summary, given the considerable financial potential from gaming, the FSIN
and Province regarded casino development in Saskatchewan as a pragmatic means to
improve socio-economic conditions in Aboriginal communities. The FSIN and the
Province envisioned casino development as a viable economic development strategy
whereby both parties of the partnership could benefit financially through shared revenues
and resources. Moreover, the American tribal gaming experience provided an example of
an Aboriginal development project that contributed to economic self-sufficiency and
nation-building.
2.2.2 Social Development Objectives of the Partnership
A second major factor that contributed to the creation of the FSIN – Province of
Saskatchewan gaming partnership was the social development objectives of the First
Nations governments and the provincial government. Their mutual objectives were
rooted in a shared understanding of the need for social development throughout the
province both in Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities.
Both the provincial and Aboriginal governments were particularly cognizant of
the need to deal with potentially increasing social development problems among the First
Nations’ population stemming from a rapid increase in population without a
corresponding increase in social development opportunities.62 At the time that they began
to consider the gaming partnerships both orders of government had developed a shared
understanding that the future of the province was heavily dependant on what happened to
the rapidly increasing Aboriginal population. Both recognized that such an increase in
population would only have a positive effect on the province if there were substantial
improvements to the socio-economic conditions among members of Aboriginal
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communities. They also realized that there are some substantial barriers to socio-
economic development in Aboriginal communities throughout the province, the most
notable of which is the low levels of human and social capital.
To fully understand the importance of such obstacles within the Aboriginal
communities, it is important to delineate the demographic profile of the Aboriginal
population within Saskatchewan. Some of the most important statistics are as follows: the
average personal income level is approximately one-half of that of the non-Aboriginal
individual; only 31percent of the Aboriginal individuals of labour-force age are
employed; 61percent of Aboriginal persons over the age of 15 do not complete their high
school education; and infant mortality rates are 2.5 times the national average.63
Furthermore, if current Aboriginal birth and education rates persist, and opportunities for
Aboriginal people do not improve, the outcome will be a substantial increase in
Aboriginal unemployment, decreased personal incomes, and substantial increased
reliance on government assistance.64
The challenges and barriers that arise in Aboriginal socio-economic development
projects vary from reserve to reserve depending on factors such as the natural resources
available, the location or access to market, the size of the band, economies of scale, and
the degree of human capital within the community.65 These factors also play an important
role in determining the feasibility of the business and economic development strategies,
and their level of success.
The FSIN and the Province agreed that the development of a partnership in the
gaming sector would contribute to their shared objective of increasing social
development in the Aboriginal sector both by employing Aboriginals in casinos and by
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using a substantial portion of the profits that each of them would collect to foster social
development. The provincial government was convinced that this was a good investment
and for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities and it decided to devote $1.75
million dollars to “cover the costs of developing the [gaming] partnership” with the
FSIN.66 According to the Saskatchewan Minister responsible for economic development
at that time, that funding provided a means to establish the gaming project aimed at
building a “capital pool to build and renew the infrastructure [in Aboriginal communities]
that has been sadly ignored by governments since the treaties were signed over a hundred
years ago.”67 The financial investment made by the Province was an essential ingredient
to the development of First Nations casinos to fund the initial operational cost. This
funding was required, because one of the greatest constraints in the establishment of
Aboriginal business ventures is to obtain access to financial capital.68
As a means to enhance socio-economic development in the Aboriginal sector, the
FSIN and provincial government agreed that hiring of Aboriginal people should be a
priority for casinos operated by First Nations. Both of them recognized that this would
allow Aboriginal workers to gain employment experience, skills and training that would
result in enhanced human and social capital within their communities. The result of that
agreement is that approximately seventy percent of the employees at the Saskatchewan
Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA) are Aboriginal, and as of March 2002, SIGA employed
1107 people.69 Both of them recognized that in addition to attaining employment at the
casinos, the training and skills that workers gained at SIGA run casinos would be
transferable to other enterprises whenever individual chose to change employment paths.
For its part SIGA has had the long-term objective of increasing the Aboriginal percentage
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of employees to eighty percent, and aims to develop a human resource development
strategy that includes post-secondary education for management personnel.70 To facilitate
the strategy to further Aboriginal education, SIGA has initiated a partnership with the
First Nations University of Canada (formerly the Saskatchewan Indian Federated
College). Through this partnership a “Gaming Administration and Casino Management”
certificate program was developed to address the need for a skilled labour force with
specialized training in casino management.71 As a proponent of advancing education,
skill and training levels SIGA, the FSIN’s agent in the partnership, is in the process of
enriching human capital amongst Aboriginal people.
In summary, for the FSIN and for the Province, casinos were a part of an
economic development strategy that is important to eliminate the immense socio-
economic inequities that exist between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples, to reduce
the devastating dependency cycle, to increase social and human capital, and to improve
community infrastructures. They also believed that when economic self-sufficiency is
achieved within Aboriginal communities, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal citizens
benefit because Aboriginal people are able to make an even greater contribution to the
growth of the economy.72
2.2.3 Political Objectives of the Partnership
The third major factor that contributed to the establishment of the FSIN -
Province of Saskatchewan gaming partnership was their respective political objectives.
The FSIN’s political objectives were to enhance political autonomy of First Nations by
enhancing their level of economic self-sufficiency. For its part, the FSIN believed that
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Aboriginal economic development is inextricably linked to self-governance and nation-
building. Indeed, there is a belief that economic and political development are mutually
reinforcing.73 Whereas some believe that economic development is a pre-condition for
political development, others believe that without political development “economic
development is likely to remain a frustrating elusive dream.”74 Those who espouse such
views believe that the dependency cycle of Aboriginal governments and their
communities cannot be transformed to a state of economic self-sufficiency without
gaining the capacity to generate their own wealth.75 The postulation is that a strong
economic base is crucial for Aboriginal communities to preserve traditional values,
practices, and cultures and to strengthen the community spirit.76
Gaining control of casinos was also viewed an important step in the political as
well as the economic development of First Nations. Among other things, it was hoped
that it would lead to the creation of some important governance institutions such as the
Community Development Corporation (CDC) that consists of representatives from the
host Tribal Council and other Tribal Councils.77 These representatives distribute revenues
in communities for the purposes of augmenting socio-economic, education, cultural,
health, justice and recreational development.  The desire for such institutions to be
relatively autonomous from the provincial government is underscored in the 1995
Framework Agreement which states that the FSIN trustees are empowered to use their
own discretion to develop strategies to enhance the socio-economic wellness of their
communities.78 Through the creation of such institutions Aboriginal people are
“regaining control over decisions that affect their communities….”79 According to the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal People (RCAP) the creation of First Nation institutions
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and control over decision-making within such institutions is an essential ingredient to
building and sustaining Aboriginal economic self-sufficiency and political autonomy. 80
Promoting Aboriginal self-determination was also an objective of the provincial
government in Saskatchewan. This aim is reflected in the Lieutenant Governor’s Speech
from the Throne in April 1992:
Aboriginal people strengthen Saskatchewan’s rich cultural identity. My government recognizes and will
promote the right of Indian and Metis people to self-determination and self-reliance, respecting
also their right to define, apply and practice their own cultures, customs and traditional
community values.81
Entering into a gaming partnership was in keeping with that objectives articulated in the
Speech from the Throne.
In summary, the FSIN and the Province of Saskatchewan entered into a
partnership arrangement with the shared purpose of promoting Aboriginal self-
determination and self-sufficiency. The cooperative strategy of a partnership advances
self-determination by entrusting the control over decision-making and economic
advancement to the Aboriginal leaders and their communities.82
2.2.4 Jurisdictional Imperatives for the Partnership
A fourth factor that contributed to the creation of the FSIN – Province of
Saskatchewan partnership in gaming was the jurisdictional imperatives of the two
governmental protagonists. Despite the mutual socio-economic and political objectives
for casino development in the province, the FSIN and the Province diverged on their
view of jurisdictional authority of gaming activities on-reserve. The jurisdictional aspect
of gaming on reserve was a contentious issue between Aboriginal organizations and the
Province of Saskatchewan because the legal obligation of the Province, with respect to
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gaming, is located in the s. 207 of Criminal Code which specifies that all gaming
activities are provincial jurisdiction. Conversely, The FSIN and Aboriginal leaders assert
that gaming on-reserve is an inherent right.83 This dichotomy between the two parties on
this issue created substantial tension. These tensions were exacerbated in 1993 with the
occurrence of a volatile situation on the White Bear Reserve. It is useful to explain the
circumstances surrounding the incident on the White Bear Reserve because the situation
did heighten the jurisdictional controversy of gaming on-reserve, and required an
expeditious resolution by the Province and Aboriginal organizations.
In February 1993, Chief Shepherd and Council opened a casino on the White Bear
First Nation Indian Reserve because they believed that a casino operation, similar to the
ones they had studied and visited in the United States, had great potential to improve the
socio-economic difficulties on-reserve. The casino development on-reserve was
perceived to be an inherent right, and was viewed as a plausible tourist industry that
complimented the existing golf course and lake resort.84  Before opening the casino Chief
Shepherd generated letters explaining their intentions to government agencies, including
the Carlyle Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) detachment. The Chief and Council
also established a mandate for regulating and operating gaming on-reserve. However, on
March 22, 1993, an inflammatory situation occurred as the RCMP executed an armed
search warrant on the Bear Claw Casino (on the White Bear Reserve), seizing $90,000
and all gaming activity equipment and laid charges against Chief Shepherd and three
council members.85 In October 1994, the charges were dismissed, even though the
argument that the White Bear Reserve controlled and operated a ‘common gaming house’
was substantiated with evidence. The two reasons asserted in the decision to dismiss the
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charges were that the Chief and Council “honestly believed that they did not surrender
their rights to self-government,”86 and “that a good argument exists that the White Bear
First Nations has the right and ability to control gaming on the reserve as an aspect of the
right to self – government protected under s.35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and s.91
(24) of the Constitutional Act 1867.”87  
The incident at Bear Claw Casino on the White Bear Reserve had the potential to
be explosive, and to create inimical relations amongst the First Nations and the Province.
Instead, the FSIN and the Province sought a collaborative, rather than confrontational,
approach to resolve the jurisdictional issue of gaming. Their hope was that by addressing
such issues through a collaborative approach, relations between the Aboriginal and
provincial governments in the province were more likely to be more positive and
productive in the future. The creation of a partnership arrangement was a mutually
acceptable approach to settle the controversial jurisdictional issue over casino
development in Saskatchewan.
To fully grasp the salience of the jurisdictional issues of First Nations casino
development in Saskatchewan, a brief explanation of the historical context of gambling
provisions in Canada is necessary. Gambling in Canada has grown exponentially over the
past two-three decades. This is a trend that correlates with changes to gambling
provisions in the Criminal Code. In 1892, for instance, the Criminal Code prohibited
gambling activities; and, by 1925, games of chance were permitted at annual fairs and
exhibitions. However, significant changes were instituted in 1969 and 1985 which
transformed the nature and scope of gambling in Canada.88
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Since the s.190 amendment to the Criminal Code in 1969, lotteries, bingo and
games of chance became a valuable source of revenue for government treasuries and
charitable organizations.89 This change allowed federal and provincial governments to
“conduct and manage lottery schemes,” and license charitable organizations to do the
same.90 In June of 1985, the provincial and federal governments signed a contract
referred to as the Lotteries Agreement that was contingent upon amendments to the
Criminal Code being approved by December 31, 1985. Subsequently, amendments were
made to what was in 1969, s190, to become s207. 1(a) – (h) of the Criminal Code in
1985.91 These changes were the outcome of federal – provincial deliberations
surrounding the revenues and operations of lottery schemes. The changes to the Criminal
Code ultimately transferred the federal authority of lottery and gaming activities to the
provinces.
In order to gain control of these activities in 1985, the provinces agreed to pay the
federal government one hundred million dollars over the period of three years to
contribute to the Calgary Olympics. These funds were in exchange for the federal
government’s relinquishment of future claims to the conduct and control of lotteries and
gaming in the provinces.92  By removing the federal government from lotteries and
gaming, control of the regulations and the distribution of proceeds from lottery and
gaming schemes were ultimately provincially controlled. In other words, “gambling is
still prohibited by the Criminal Code unless it has been licensed by the appropriate
provincial authority, or unless it is being conducted by the province itself.”93
The federal to provincial transfer of authority for gaming was problematic for
First Nation bands for two reasons. First, due to the transfer, First Nations casino
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development on-reserve was considered by the province to be a criminal offence pursuant
of s207.(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.  In accordance with the amendment to the Criminal
Code, the provinces have sole jurisdiction on casino development. The First Nation
therefore requires authorization through provincial licensing to “manage or conduct a
lottery scheme….” on their reserve lands.94 The problem arises because many First
Nations perceive that the development and operation of casinos is within their
jurisdictional rights on reserve land.95 The contrasting provincial perspective is that all of
the gaming activities throughout the province, whether on reserve or not, are a provincial
jurisdiction. The Bear Claw casino incident in 1993 that occurred on the White Bear
Reserve, serves to illustrate how the diverging views of the provincial and Aboriginal
governments’ on jurisdiction have the potential to produce adversarial relations.
The second problematic aspect of the federal – provincial transfer of jurisdictional
authority of gaming was due to the fact that First Nations leaders were excluded from
these negotiations. Neither Aboriginal leaders nor organizations were consulted in the
1985 negotiations surrounding the gaming amendments to the Criminal Code.96 It is
plausible that had they been involved in discussions from the start, the jurisdictional issue
of gaming would not have been as contentious, nor required courts’ involvement to the
same degree as it has in subsequent years.
The problems were compounded because many Aboriginal leaders do not
recognize the change in the Criminal Code related to gaming, due to their belief that it is
their inherent right to exercise jurisdiction of all activities conducted on reserve lands.
Some First Nations adopted this argument by claiming that s.81 of the Indian Act
“provided for band ‘control and prohibition of public games…’”97 This position however,
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has not proven to be successful for First Nations. Even if the Indian Act made it possible
to circumvent provincial jurisdiction, it would not work for First Nations because the
Criminal Code supersedes the Indian Act. Granted, both the Indian Act and the Criminal
Code are federal statutes, however the latter takes precedence and, therefore, favours
provincial jurisdiction.98
Regardless of the Criminal Code’s amendment granting jurisdictional authority of
gaming activities to the province, Aboriginal leaders and the FSIN refute the amendment
on the grounds of inherent rights. The diverging perspectives regarding gaming on
reserve presented a challenging situation to the FSIN and the Province. The FSIN and the
Province were anxious, however, to reach an acceptable agreement that “would bridge
two competing views without permitting it to escalate into the situation that has been
etched into our memories of another debate over the issue of a golf course in Oka,
Quebec.”99
To reiterate, the Province and FSIN sought a peaceful resolution to the White
Bear situation rather than risk having acrimonious relations. The disparity over
jurisdiction on-reserve was problematic for both parties, a problem that would necessitate
a mutually acceptable resolution for the continuance of harmonious relations. The
partnership arrangement between the FSIN and the Province provided an acceptable
resolution for both actors who recognized that this was a potentially flammable issue if
respectful approaches to the resolution of the jurisdictional issues were not pursued. 
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2.2.5 Regulatory Imperatives for the Partnership
Another major factor that contributed to the emergence of the gaming partnership
between the FSIN and the Province of Saskatchewan was what might be termed
regulatory imperatives. Regulatory imperatives are considerations that “focus on the
conditions under which goods and services are produced and distributed….They are
primarily in the form of standards…and relate to issues of safety, health, employment, the
environment and a variety of social or welfare-related issues.”100 Regulatory imperatives
were particularly influential on the provincial government’s desire for a partnership in
gaming, due to the related socio-economic implications of its activities.  Specific
considerations that led the provincial government to enter into the partnership were as
follows:
 It was perceived by the province that there was “no gaming strategy” in an industry
that was experiencing immense growth throughout North America.101
 The jurisdictional issue on gaming was a highly controversial topic of debate in the
legislature that required an expeditious settlement.102
 In light of the tremendous expansion in gaming in North America, the industry
required a “very strong regulatory body [with] careful control and regulation;”103
whereby the accountability aspect of gaming was “one of the prime and most
important aspects…of the development of the casinos.”104
The province acknowledged the need for a committed role in the establishment of a
regulatory framework in which the gaming industry should function in Saskatchewan.105
The province’s solution to manage the problems of jurisdiction, regulation, and
accountability in gaming was threefold. First, by engaging in a partnership with FSIN the
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issue of jurisdiction in gaming was, in part, resolved by establishing the means for some
First Nations control of gaming through a collaborative partnership. Second,
consolidating the two operations of the Liquor Commission and the Gaming Commission
into the Liquor and Gaming Authority provided the improved regulation in gaming by
establishing new regulation and review provisions. The Authority is a licensing and
regulatory body that has two components: “to set out the rules and regulations for the
Authority” (after and upon cabinet direction) and, an appeal board to “review decisions
made with respect to regulations.”106 By adding this component to the regulatory
framework, the Province envisioned a strengthened approach to regulating an industry
that was experiencing rapid expansion and change.
The province’s third initiative to address the issues of regulation and
accountability in the gaming industry was to establish a new Crown Corporation. The
Saskatchewan Gaming Investment Corporation was created to “establish, to operate,
manage, and conduct casino operations in Saskatchewan under the full legislative
authority of this Assembly.”107 The accountability framework is similar to other Crown
Corporations in Saskatchewan; and, in this instance, appointed four provincial
representatives and three FSIN members. The Saskatchewan Gaming Investment
Corporation’s mandate is twofold:  (1) to ensure accountability of gaming through an
administrative structure, and (2) to ensure the maintenance of proper accounting practices
in order to control the gaming industry. The Crown Corporation was legislated in the
Second Reading, Bill No. 72, in the legislature of May of 1994. 108 After deliberation on
the gaming issues surrounding jurisdiction, regulation, management, and governance, the
Province consulted with the FSIN about the prospect of forming a partnership. Because
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both parties were cognizant of the synergistic relations produced by a partnership, the
FSIN and the Province initiated a consultation process for an arrangement. Shortly,
thereafter the Province and FSIN entered into negotiations to resolve differences and
formulate a partnership arrangement.
2.3 Conclusion
In recent years we have witnessed an upsurge in two unrelated phenomena in
Canada –collaborative partnerships and First Nations casino development. In 1995, these
two phenomena merged to produce the FSIN-Saskatchewan gaming partnership. The key
factors that led to the signing of that partnership agreement are three major sets of shared
objectives (i.e, financial, social, and political) and two sets of imperatives (i.e.,
jurisdictional and regulatory). Evidently, what might be termed interjurisdictional
emulation was also an influential factor as the FSIN and the Province studied and
borrowed from the experiences of First Nation and state governments in the United States
in making decisions regarding their partnership and the location and operation of
casinos.109
Given that the FSIN and the Province of Saskatchewan saw merit in establishing a
casino development partnership to accomplish mutual objectives, the next step in the
evolutionary process was to negotiate an agreement. The next chapter will focus on the
fundamental issues of this negotiation process, and the nature of the key provisions for
the resulting agreement.
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Before turning to the next chapter, however, it is important to note that although
the FSIN and the provincial government were the major protagonists in the partnership
initiative, their decisions were not made without considerable public reaction, most of
which was negative.  Notwithstanding the various benefits that the FSIN and the
provincial government believed could be derived from gaming, their decision to enter
into a partnership that would expand gaming in the province was not without its critics.
The expansion of gaming within the province ran into some strong organized opposition
from the public at a very early stage.  Such opposition was most visible in 1994 in a
Saskatoon plebiscite which resulted in the obstruction of proposed casino development in
that city. The opposition to the casino in Saskatoon was led by a citizens’ coalition group
which held rallies and circulated a petition to mobilize support against gaming activities
in that city. Their work captured considerable media attention to and produced a strong
opposition to the proposed casino development. In making the case against gambling the
opponents cited studies by researchers who maintain that gambling does not generate
additional revenue and employment, but merely diverts employment and revenue from
other sectors of the local economy.110 While some of the opponents of the gaming
initiative focused on economic arguments, others focused on ethical arguments regarding
the involvement of the provincial and Aboriginal governments being involved in the
casino industry. Ultimately, of course, neither the economic nor ethical arguments
dissuaded the FSIN and provincial governments from entering into a partnership for
gaming in the province of Saskatchewan. The reason for this is that, as has been
explained in this chapter, there were three sets of objectives and two sets of imperatives
that influenced their decisions to enter into the gaming partnership.
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Chapter 3
The Nature of Negotiations for and the Nature of
the 1995 FSIN – Province of Saskatchewan Partnership Agreement
3.1 Introduction
The Province of Saskatchewan and the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian
Nations (FSIN) shared financial, social, and political objectives that served as catalysts
for the creation of a gaming partnership. Those objectives led them to engage in
consultations and negotiations to produce a contractual agreement for the development of
First Nations casinos in the province. The negotiations to establish the agreement
between the FSIN and the Province of Saskatchewan were initiated in 1993 and
completed in November 1995. The result of these deliberations was the signing of the
two fundamental documents of the partnership: The 1995 Framework Agreement
(Agreement) in February 1995, and The Casino Operating Agreement (COA) signed in
November 1995. These two key documents contain the regulatory, operational, and
management provisions for the FSIN – Province of Saskatchewan gaming partnership.
The objective of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the negotiations related
to those two documents and the key provisions in each document. Toward that end this
chapter consists of three major sections. The first section provides an overview of the
nature of the negotiations surrounding the development of provisions in the partnership.
The second section provides an overview of the key provisions included in the 1995
Framework Agreement. The third section examines the 1995 Casino Operating
Agreement with special attention to the roles and responsibilities of the two agents of the
partnership – Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA) and the
Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA).
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3.2 The Nature of Negotiations
The Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) and the Province of
Saskatchewan entered into negotiations in 1993 to develop the terms of the partnership
arrangement that provided a regulatory, management, and accountability framework for
the partnership.111 Those negotiations resulted in the signing of the 1995 Framework
Agreement (Agreement), and of the 1995 Casino Operating Agreement (COA) eight
months later. These negotiations were conducted by representatives of the FSIN and the
provincial government, including the FSIN Grand Chief and two FSIN representatives,
two provincial senior civil servants, and the provincial minister responsible for the
Gaming Commission. This relatively small number of participants at the negotiation table
and their interpersonal relations contributed to a climate of trust and respect.112
The FSIN and provincial representatives involved in the negotiations of the
partnership arrangements had shared objectives. The most significant shared objective
was to improve Aboriginal economic development that enabled Aboriginal people to
achieve their own aspirations of a business venture conducted by Aboriginal people; and
to mitigate the contention over gaming sovereignty on-reserve.113 Despite differing
perspectives, such as those that existed regarding on-reserve gaming, the FSIN and the
Province recognized that more progress would be made through a cooperative and
constructive negotiation process. There were four issues, however, on the negotiating
table that complicated the negotiation process, and as a result, a prolonged resolution.
This included the issues of jurisdiction, the number and location of First Nations casinos,
the revenue distribution formula, and an electronic gaming regulatory framework.
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The first issue on the negotiation table for the FSIN and the provincial
government representatives was the jurisdictional aspect of gaming. In fact, the discourse
on the matter of jurisdiction continues today, as it is a paramount theme that resonates
throughout the life cycle of the partnership. At the start of the negotiations, both sides had
firmly entrenched viewpoints on the issue of jurisdiction for gaming that caused an
impasse in the negotiations. The province’s position was, and remains, that gaming is a
provincial responsibility pursuant of s.207 (1) of the Criminal Code, which specifies that
the licensing and management of gaming is the sole responsibility of the province.
However, in accordance with the requirements of 207 (1)(b), the province may authorize
a charitable organization to conduct and manage gaming provided that the province
grants a license, and that the profits are allocated for charitable or religious purposes. In
order to comply with the Criminal Code s. 207 (1)(b), the Agreement classifies the
Saskatchewan Indian and Gaming Authority (SIGA) as a charitable organization. This
designation provides SIGA with the license to manage and operate table games in the
First Nations casinos.
The FSIN position was, and continues to be today, that gaming on reserve is a
sovereign right, which is constitutionally protected under s.35 of the Constitution Act,
1982. The FSIN views gaming activities as an economic and commercial right under
inherent and treaty rights on reserve lands in Saskatchewan.114 Notwithstanding their
respective positions on the jurisdictional issue, the FSIN and the Province agreed to
disagree on their diverging perspectives and proceeded forward with the negotiations for
provisions of the partnership. The jurisdictional provision that was agreed upon is
specified in s.2.1 of the Agreement, and is as follows:
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The Government and the FSIN agree to work together to develop and present to the
Government of Canada proposals which would allow First Nations full jurisdiction in
relation to all forms of gaming on reserves, either through amendments to the Criminal
Code of Canada or new federal legislation. 115
By developing the jurisdictional proposal, the FSIN and the Province demonstrated a
commitment to mitigate a thorny issue that was in essence unsolvable without provisions
for future cooperative measures.
The second issue of the negotiation process was to determine how many First
Nations casinos should be developed, and the location of such casinos. During the early
stages of negotiations this particular matter was not an issue, as it was agreed that there
would be two casinos in the province, one government operated casino in Regina and one
First Nations casino in Saskatoon.116 However, in October 1994, the citizens of
Saskatoon rejected the proposal of a First Nations casino development in the downtown
core of the city, thus dramatically altering the negotiation agenda.
At this point it is useful to explain the process for establishing a First Nations
casino. The explanation will illustrate how that process added to the complexity of
negotiations, and to the number of provisions in the resulting agreement. Before approval
for a casino facility is granted in Saskatchewan, a process of municipal consultation,
market evaluations, economic viability, and community impact studies is required.117 If
the municipality or municipal council rejects the proposal for casino development, it can
be denied. This was the situation in October 1994, when Saskatoon voted on the proposal
to build a downtown casino, and it was “rejected by an overwhelming margin of 50,938
to 13,182.”118
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Due to the rejection of the proposal, renegotiations commenced between the FSIN
and the Province to determine the number of casinos, and to decide upon alternative
locations in Saskatchewan. As a result of the completion of municipal approval processes
for casino development and then renegotiations, it was agreed that there would be four
First Nations casinos to be established in the cities of Prince Albert, North Battleford,
Yorkton and on the White Bear Reserve (the Bear Claw Casino).119
Once the decision was made as to the location, design and number of First
Nations casinos, the issue was to determine an appropriate, equitable revenue distribution
formula. In addition to deciding on how the revenues should be allocated amongst the
partners, there were two factors that further complicated deliberations. First, the
exhibition associations and various charitable organizations rely upon gaming as their
primary means of fundraising; therefore, compensatory considerations were necessary to
mitigate possible adverse effects for such associations and organizations from new
gaming facilities within the province. Second, it was essential that the Province not
exclude the Metis Nation of Saskatchewan with respect to gaming revenues, due to its
stated objective to promote the self-reliance of Metis people.120 It was therefore important
to allocate gaming revenues to provide financial assistance to bolster economic activities
for Metis people (similar to First Nations, the Metis Nation also strives to stimulate
economic development within their communities). Negotiators had to agree on a revenue
sharing formula for profit distribution amongst themselves as partners; and, to agree on
the allocation of funds for other charitable organizations and for the Metis Nation in
Saskatchewan.
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Adding to the complexity of deciding on an appropriate revenue sharing formula
was the fact that the gaming trend in Canada was experiencing a major upsurge, which
made the prediction of anticipated revenues difficult to determine. Part of the reason for
this was that although casinos were operational in Saskatchewan through the exhibition
associations, they were not on the same scale or design as the proposed First Nations
development.121 Overall, the revenue sharing formula was something for which achieving
consensus was challenging. The revenue formula that was chosen would remain
unchanged until 1998, when amendments were instituted due to exceptionally high profit
margins.
The fourth matter that complicated the negotiations was the issue of electronic
gaming machines. The amount of energy expended on deliberations over this issue
diverted attention from the corporate level accountability specifications, to an emphasis
on accountability provisions for electronic gaming machines in casino operations. The
operational and regulatory aspects of electronic gaming machines are crucial for two
reasons. 122  First, they can “consume up to 80% of the gambling volume” and can
generate substantial profits in the industry. 123  Second, the Criminal Code has a different
licensing scheme designation for electronic gaming devices.124  In Saskatchewan, for
example, the Province owns electronic gaming machines, which adds another control
dimension to the management of these activities. The matters of complexity for
negotiation and consultations thus became twofold. How many machines should be
operational throughout the four casinos so as to maintain equal distribution throughout
the province? And second, what provisions are required to manage and operate gaming
machines pursuant to s.207 (1)(b) of the Criminal Code? The resolution of this issue
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involved SIGA’s consent to comply with the ‘Operating Policies and Directives’
established in the 1995 Casino Operating Agreement (COA); the limitation of SIGA’s
authority of slot machines; and to construct an agreement attached to the COA –
Appendix Slot Machine Management Agreement.125
The negotiations between the Province and the FSIN concluded by each of them
agreeing to a structural framework that would resolve the various issues at the table,
notably those relating to jurisdiction, revenue sharing, First Nation casino development
sites, and electronic gaming considerations. These partnership arrangements would be
specified in provisions of the 1995 Framework Agreement, and are discussed in the
following section.
 3.3 The 1995 Framework Agreement
The Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) – Province of Saskatchewan
gaming partnership is a legally binding, long-term, formal partnership, which involves a
contractual arrangement to solidify its terms. The contractual arrangement was arrived at
after a two-year negotiation process, whereby the provincial minister, Hon. J. Crawford
and FSIN Grand Chief B. Favel signed the 1995 Framework Agreement in February
1995.  The key provisions of that agreement deal with the following matters: the duration
of the arrangement; the municipal considerations of casino development; the future
development of First Nations casinos; the revenue sharing formula; the employment
equity;  the electronic gaming regulations; the nature of  future consultations; and the
responsibilities of the partners.
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In addition to these particular sets of provisions regarding the contractual
arrangement, there are also some provisions regarding the two incorporated bodies –
Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA) and Saskatchewan Indian Gaming
Authority (SIGA). These two bodies are established pursuant of the Non-Profit
Corporation Act for the “purposes of entering into the arrangements” and to function as
‘agents’ of the partnership. Before discussing the nature of the provisions in the
contractual agreement, it is beneficial to provide an explanation of the nature of these
‘agents’ of the partnership, SIGA and SLGA.
3.3.1 The ‘Agents’ of the Partnership
To perform the operational, regulatory and licensing functions of the gaming
activities in Saskatchewan, the partners agreed to appoint SLGA and SIGA as the
‘agents’ of the partnership. The agent on behalf of the Province is the SLGA. It is a
Treasury Board Crown Corporation that functions as the regulating body for the six
casinos in Saskatchewan.126 SLGA is “responsible for the distribution, control and
regulation of liquor and gaming” in a manner that promote financial efficacy, and social
responsibilities.127 SLGA is governed by and operates under the Alcohol and Gaming
Regulations Act of Saskatchewan.  In addition, it administers The Alcohol Control
Regulations and The Gaming Licensing Regulations.
 SIGA is a non-profit corporation designated as a charitable organization under
the Non Profits Corporations Act of Saskatchewan. SIGA is the “proponent on behalf of
the FSIN” both on an off reserves, pursuant to the Agreement.128 “SIGA is not and does
not act as an agent SLGA, and shall not enter into any agreement with third parties.”129
Instead, it is an incorporated body of the FSIN and is the operational agent of the
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partnership with the contractual authority to enter into the Casino Operating Agreement
(COA) with the SLGA. SIGA’s mandate is to “conduct all business, marketing and
management functions” of the four First Nations casinos in Saskatchewan.130
The Board of Directors for SIGA consisted of eleven members; one member
appointed by the FSIN, and the remaining members appointed from each of the ten Tribal
Councils.131 The Board members can have a three-year term, and candidates “should be
selected for their actual or potential expertise in the business and management of casinos
and VLT sites.”132 The Chair of the Board is required to report activities of SIGA’s
operations to Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Commission (SIGC), and is responsible for
the overall conduct and management of the meetings. SIGA reports to the Saskatchewan
Indian and Gaming Commission (SIGC) on a regular basis as specified in the Act
Respecting First Nations Gaming. 133 In addition to this internal reporting system, SIGA
agreed to provide SLGA with casino operation records for auditing purposes on an
annual basis, or at a particular time when deemed appropriate by SLGA.
SIGA has been established pursuant to An Act Respecting First Nations Gaming
(Act) which was enacted by the FSIN. The Act provides key provisions regarding SIGA
and some other FSIN agencies that are important for the gaming industry. The Act was
enacted as part of the FSIN’s efforts to reorganize its internal structure designed to
coordinate its operational, regulatory and licensing responsibilities related to the
partnership arrangement pursuant to the 1995 Agreement. This resulted in the creation of
three corporate bodies, the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA); the
Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Commission (SIGC); and the Saskatchewan Indian
Gaming Licensing (SIGL). The roles and responsibilities of these three bodies are
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identified in the 1995 Framework Agreement. However, the Act provides a more precise,
detailed of description of the specific nature of SIGA, SIGC, and SIGL.
The first important agency of the FSIN for gaming is SIGA whose core function
is described above. The second agency of the FSIN is SIGC, whose membership is by
appointment by the FSIN, in accordance to the First Nations Convention Act. The First
Nations Gaming Act prescribes SIGC’s mandate as the ‘political management’ of all
gaming activities that includes the creation and supervision of activities of SIGA, and is
“empowered to develop guidelines and regulations for the further definition of any
provision of the [First Nations Convention] Act.”134 Furthermore, SIGC is a “recognized
Commission of the Federation with full authority, subject to Treasury Board approval of
annual budgets….”135 In the governing of operations, SIGC follows the customs and
conventions established by the FSIN, in particular, consensus decision-making. In 1996,
however, the SIGC was reorganized and as a result, the gaming portfolio was assigned to
the Economic Development Commission of the FSIN.
The third body created by FSIN is the corporate licensing entity - SIGL. It is a
five-member subcommittee of SIGC, and it provides regular reports to SIGC. Its mandate
is to develop fees, protocols, and licensing standards for the “operation and management
of charitable lotteries on reserve in Saskatchewan” and for the development of
regulations for licensing and operating policies of the casinos.136 Like the SIGC, the
provisions for SIGL are located in the Act Respecting First Nations Gaming, albeit
provisions regarding licensing operations are also located in the Agreement. SIGL, SIGC
and SIGA provide FSIN with the structures necessary to conduct the functions required
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for the operations, management, development, and improvement of the First Nations
casinos established in Saskatchewan.
In addition to these three agencies established by the Act Respecting First Nations
Gaming, FSIN established a separate entity known as the First Nations Rehabilitation
Fund (FNARF). The FNARF is an agent of FSIN with a mandate to “ensure that effective
and accessible prevention and treatment programs are available to First Nations people
affected by gaming addictions.”137 FNARF will implement its mandate by developing
and coordinating partnerships with agencies that will deliver effective programming
related to prevention and treatment of gaming addictions.
3.3.2 The Nature of the Provisions in the 1995 Framework
This section describes the fundamental provisions specified for the Province –
FSIN gaming partnership. The provisions of the 1995 Framework Agreement include
stipulations regarding the following: the time frame of the agreement, future development
considerations, electronic gaming specifications, revenue sharing formula, employment
equity provisions, future collaboration expectations, and the terms of partnership
relations. These will be briefly described in the order as listed above.
1) Timeframe of the Agreement. The Agreement was signed for a five-year term. The
time frame was of relative importance given that the partners were embarking on a
business venture that was new in terms of the magnitude of gaming activities proposed.
Furthermore, the Province was the first government in Canada to develop a partnership in
gaming with a First Nations organization; 138 therefore, an unprecedented partnership in
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terms of the framework models available for reference. Considering these two factors, the
five-year term was an appropriate time frame for the arrangement.
2) Future Casino Development. Because future casino development is an important
consideration in the overall long-term economic sustainability of the industry, regulatory
provisions were developed to maintain and promote successful investment in First
Nations casinos. The Province agreed it would not entertain the proposal for a new casino
in a municipality where a First Nations casino is established. This provision provides a
right for the preservation or level of integrity of First Nations casinos. However, if the
FSIN is to submit a proposal for the establishment of a new casino, it must contain
market evaluations, development plans that are appropriate to the local community, and it
must be approved by a resolution passed by the municipality council, or on reserve,
approval by the First Nation must be granted. Moreover, it is stipulated that for a five-
year duration, the Province will only accept a proposal for casino expansion in Saskatoon
from the FSIN. Following this five-year period, the Province will consider a third party
casino proposal, but will provide FSIN with notification and the “time to prepare and
submit a proposal of its own in accordance with this Agreement” and will “give full, fair
and equal consideration to both proposals.139 These provisions do offer some measure to
safeguard First Nations casinos from market competition or market saturation. However,
because the Province through SLGA functions as the regulator and operator of gaming
activities, and in part, the competitor, it is conceivable that these provisions are not
sufficient protection should the Province adopt expansionary notions.
3) Electronic Gaming. Three regulatory provisions for the electronic gaming aspects of
the partnership are specified as follows. First, the number of machines in the four First
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Nations casinos collectively could not exceed the number of machines in Regina. In other
words, there was ceiling placed on the quantity of slot machines for the four casinos,
which were 500 machines (this number was equivalent to the number that had initially
agreed upon in the 1994 Agreement proposed for the Saskatoon casino expansion
project).140 Second, it was agreed that SLGA “shall have the conduct and management of
all Slot machines in the Casinos as required by Section 207 of the Criminal Code of
Canada.”141 In addition, it was agreed “that the FSIN may propose VLT sites on reserves”
providing that specific requirements in accordance to the Criminal Code are
maintained.142
4) Revenue Sharing Formula. The end result of deliberations over the revenue sharing
formula was that the Agreement contained provisions for both on and off reserve profit
distribution, which were as follows:
 on reserve distribution = “50% to the First Nations Trust fund, 25% to the
Government, and 25% to be distributed, through the First Nations Trust, for
charitable purposes to First Nations”143
 off reserve distribution = 50% First Nations, 25% Government and 25% to the
Associated Entities Fund.144
 The distribution of profit was amended in 1998, due to the unanticipated high
profits generated. This changed the equation to 37.5% to First Nations and
37.5% to Government and the remaining 25% to the Community Initiatives
Fund off reserve, or alternatively, on reserve 25% to the Community
Development Corporation. 145
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 A revenue sharing agreement was established for the VLT sites on reserve,
that entitles the First Nations Trust Fund to 85%, the Province 15% of the
gross VLT revenues (less winnings).146
5. Employment Equity. Due to the partners’ mutual aim to increase employment within
the Aboriginal community, it was important to acknowledge that objective by instituting
a provision for “special employment programs” for Aboriginal people in First Nations
casino operations.147 The ramifications for this objective have been largely successful.
For instance, as of 1998, the First Nations casinos employed 1,063 people, seventy
percent of those employees are Aboriginal people.148 Moreover, by 2001, SIGA and the
Saskatchewan Indian Federated College initiated a joint project aimed at human resource
development. This project involves funding and program delivery collaboration, in order
to offer a casino management and a gaming administration university program for
Aboriginal students.
6) Future Collaboration Expectations. The stipulations formulated for the future
collaboration arrangements are identified in Part 6 of the Agreement. Three noteworthy
provisions were agreed upon. First, that further collaboration was needed to implement
provisions for the roles and responsibilities of the agents of the partnership and the
overall conduct and management of gaming operations. This provision refers to the
construction of the 1995 Casino Operating Agreement (COA), and it was agreed that
operations would not commence until this agreement was created and signed. Second, it
was agreed that future collaboration would occur to ensure that the Saskatchewan Indian
Gaming Licensing had the applicable terms and conditions required for the issuance of
licenses for charitable lotteries on reserves. Third, it was agreed that the partners would
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continue to negotiate and work together in ‘good faith’ on the jurisdictional proposals to
the federal government. By identifying the expectations of future collaboration between
the partners, the management framework is enhanced because future roles and
expectations are defined. Furthermore, a benchmark for future assessment is established,
which is an important element to the accountability and management framework of a
partnership.
7) Partnership Relations. Lastly, the sections “Good Faith and Mediation” (Part 7), and
“Enforcement and Termination.” (Part 9), stipulate the partnering relations to one
another.149 In Part 7, the partners agree to “consult in good faith to resolve any
dispute….”, which will be a function of designated representative from each party for the
purposes of consultation.150 If these representatives are unable to resolve the dispute, the
parties agree to mediation through a mutually acceptable mediator. Part 9, “Enforcement
and Termination’ specified that “the Government’s obligation or ability to prosecute
under applicable laws” is not limited if a First Nations casino is established that is not
pursuant of the Agreement. Further, it is stipulated that “[e]ither party may terminate this
Agreement if the other party defaults in performing or observing any of its obligations
under this Agreement, by given written notice of termination to such defaulting party.”151
It is important here to provide protection against possible risks, albeit the commitment to
trust, integrity and conflict resolution are also necessary in order to achieve a level of
success in the partnership.152
Despite the formulation of provisions for the arrangement that were, for the most
part, determined by the highly influential elements of the negotiating process, there was
an oversight on the specifications of the accountability framework for the partnership.
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For instance, there were insufficient provisions that clearly identified the roles and
responsibilities of the corporate level of the agent of the partnership, SIGA. This included
for instance, its Board structure, communication procedures with SLGA, information
management and evaluation, and accountability expectations for corporate business (i.e.,
sponsorship and travel expenses). In addition to this oversight, there was a lack of criteria
related to the accountability aspects for the First Nations Trust Fund.153 There were, for
example, no provisions to indicate the roles and responsibilities, the definition of the
Trustees’ accountability relationships, nor of the powers and authorities for the Trustees
of the Fund. These inadequate provisions caused an accountability crisis in the
partnership in June 2000. The lack of provisions were of concern, particularly given the
unprecedented profits generated by the casino operations, and the complexity involved in
providing equitable revenue distribution for First Nations bands throughout the province.
Nevertheless, the deficiencies in this arrangement would not be realized for
approximately five years following the procurement of the partnership’s framework
agreement which was signed in February 1995. Additionally at the time of signing the
agreement, the partners agreed that further consideration was necessary to specify the
partners’ roles and responsibilities in the operational functions of the First Nations
casinos. That agreement resulted in the 1995 Casino Operating Agreement, which will be
discussed in the subsequent section.
3.4 The 1995 Casino Operating Agreement
The 1995 Casino Operating Agreement (COA) is a result of the partners’
commitment to devise an operating agreement that refers to the conduct and operations of
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the First Nations casinos throughout Saskatchewan. In other words, according to the
Agreement, further agreements were needed within an eight-month time frame to “ensure
that the requirements of section 207 (1)(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada are satisfied
with respect to the conduct and management of the gaming operations….”154 In
November 1995, Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA) and
Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA) were the signatories of The 1995 Casino
Operating Agreement (COA). The COA specifies the roles and responsibilities, and the
operational and regulatory provisions for SLGA and SIGA – the two designated agents of
the Province and the FSIN respectively.
3.4.1 The Nature of Provisions in the 1995 Casino Operating Agreement
The COA is a comprehensive and critical document with respect to the regulatory
functions of the agents of the partnership, SLGA and SIGA. In general, there are six
noteworthy provisions, which are summarized as follows.
1) Control Provisions.  There are three provisions pertaining to the limited authority of
SIGA that are specified. These provisions are required to ensure that the Province adheres
to the requirements of the Criminal Code. First, “SLGA shall have the conduct and
management of all Slot Machines as required by Section 207 of the Criminal Code of
Canada.”155 Second, it is agreed that SLGA has the “exclusive right and authority to
establish Operating Policies and Directives”156; however, consultation with SIGA prior to
any amendments shall occur, and if in disagreement, the matter will be submitted to the
Mediation Board. Third, SLGA has the “exclusive right to annually determine the Base
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Budget”157 Should SIGA disagree with this base budget, then the matter is submitted to
the Mediation Board.
2) Accountability Provisions. Among the provisions regarding the accountability aspects
of the partnership, there are five notable provisions.
 “SIGA agrees to provide SLGA, or its agents, such access to all Casino sites and
records as SLGA shall deem necessary for the active monitoring, supervision and
inspection of the operation of Slot Machines… and all Licensed Games…”158
 SIGA agrees to provide SLGA with a “monthly report of revenues from slot
machines” and revenues from Licensed games.159
 SIGA will supply SLGA with the year’s financial condition in the form of an
“independent public accountants” report.160
 SIGA will appoint an approved auditor for licensed games, but SLGA appoints an
auditor for the slot machines.
 The gaming revenues flow from SIGA to SLGA, which will then be allocated to the
General Revenue Fund, the First Nations Trust, and the Associated Entities Fund.
Within these provisions, there is no mention, however, of a procedure for follow-up or
evaluation of reports. Stipulations of this nature are an essential aspect in the
reporting and evaluation mechanisms to ensure that remedies are implemented should
problems occur.
3) Communication Provisions. A Steering Committee consisting of an equal
representation from SLGA and SIGA was established to “facilitate and co-ordinate
communication between SLGA and SIGA.” The purpose of the Steering Committee is to
discuss and consider issues that may arise from the operations or agreements in relation
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to the casinos in the provinces, and representatives will meet “from time to time….”161
Due to the equivocal nature of this provision, SLGA and SIGA are not bound to a regular
joint process of evaluation on partnering issues. This absence of open communication is
not conducive to promoting awareness or understanding of accountability issues should
they arise within the operation and regulation of gaming. Continuity in communication
and assessment is therefore an important preventative measure to guard against potential
risks in the partnership.
4) Conflict Resolution Provisions. Specifications for mediation include establishing a
Mediation Board, the agreement on the process for disputes to the Mediation Board, and
the parties agree that “good faith” will be the conduct in the resolution of a dispute.
5) Terms for Default and Termination Provisions. The conditions for default are clearly
specified in this section, and protect the partners against possible risk relating to the
casino operations. For instance, SLGA has the right to immediately terminate the
Agreement, if SIGA fails to comply with the “Operating Policies and Directives”
stipulated in s.2.5 (which refers to the “requirements, standards, policies and procedures
relating to the management and operation of the Slot Machine and essentially related
functions and activities of the casinos…”).162 SIGA, on the other hand, has the right to
terminate the Agreement after a period of one hundred and eighty days, in the event that
SLGA defaults if it does not adhere to “any covenant, agreement or term or provision of
this Agreement….”163 These terms of default are important aspects of the arrangement to
specify the consequences for non-compliance in the partnership.  The COA provides a
regulatory framework for the operations of the First Nations casinos, and for the roles and
responsibilities of the partners’ agents, SIGA and SLGA.
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The 1995 COA and the 1995 Framework Agreement provide the provisions
necessary to license, develop, regulate, operate and manage First Nations gaming in
Saskatchewan. Despite the attempt of the partners to formulate a comprehensive,
regulatory agreement, it is not unreasonable to expect that there would be difficulties
experienced in the partnership due to the complexity of the arrangement. In addition, two
factors contributed to the partnership challenges. First, this is a unique partnership (the
first Aboriginal – governmental gaming partnership in Canada), and thus there were no
models to draw upon in their negotiations to formulate a framework. Second, the partners
encountered challenges due to the unanticipated, exponential growth that the gaming
industry in Saskatchewan experienced. For instance, the estimated projected revenues for
gaming were $6.4 million, yet the actual net profit reported for 1998 –1999 was $17
million from the four First Nations casinos.164 Given the substantial revenues generated,
and the regulatory and operational inexperience of the agents of the partnership, risks or
challenges were probable. Sound provisions had to be developed to clarify roles and
responsibilities, and to identify the communication, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation
measures amongst partners, in order that the partnership provided adequate levels of
accountability.
3.5 Conclusion
Intergovernmental partnerships, particularly those that involve differing
organizational culture and values, will inevitably face challenges in establishing and
implementing accountability framework agreements. The Federation of Saskatchewan
Indian Nations (FSIN) – Province of Saskatchewan gaming partnership is no exception to
these circumstances. After two years of deliberations, the partners signed two key
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documents that ultimately prescribed the accountability and regulatory provisions for the
partnership and its two agents, Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA) and
Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA). The partners encountered a number of
challenging issues in negotiations that required consensus including jurisdiction, location,
size of operation, and revenue distribution, all of which were reflected in the provisions
developed in the agreement. Once issues were resolved in negotiations, the key document
- 1995 Framework Agreement - was constructed, followed by the signing of the Casino
Operating Agreement within an eight-month period.
The agreement included provisions for the partnering arrangement regarding the
matters of negotiations noted above. In addition, specifications were constructed for
licensing responsibilities, future collaboration and objectives, risk management, and
conflict resolution. There were however, oversights that contributed to accountability
difficulties in the partnership. For instance, there was a lack of accountability in terms of
communication procedures, information analysis, and corporate level accountability
requirements. These particular oversights would become apparent in the accountability
challenges that surfaced in June 2000 when a consequential problem occurred in the
partnership, which was identified in the Provincial Auditor’s report as a misappropriation
of funds by SIGA. This raises the following questions. What problematic features of the
agreement can be attributed to the malfunction of the accountability and management
aspects of the partnership? What effect did those problematic features have both on the
partnership, and the renegotiations and provisions for the 2002 Framework Agreement?
These questions are the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
The Negotiations For and the Nature of the 2002 Partnership Agreement
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, a preoccupation with the accountability aspects of public enterprise
has been at the forefront of the public eye.165 The accountability performance of the gaming
partnership in Saskatchewan is no exception to this scrutiny, and has received a great deal of
attention through the media’s interpretation and subsequent dissemination of information.
Nevertheless, as partners in the gaming industry the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian
Nations (FSIN) and the Province of Saskatchewan share an important responsibility to
provide an optimum degree of accountability to one another as partners, and to the
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities in Saskatchewan. It is essential that the
Province and FSIN outline and prepare policies that strive to attain an overall satisfactory
level of a clear, well-defined formal and informal accountability framework for the
partnership.166 The development, implementation, and sustainability of credible
accountability framework of a partnership is a process - a process that requires refinement by
recurrent communication, adjustment, and evaluation of the objectives and roles and
responsibilities of its partners.
It is, however, a difficult task to design and implement an accountability
framework for an intergovernmental partnership, due to the plethora of considerations
required in the construction for an appropriate framework. This is particularly the case in the
FSIN – Province of Saskatchewan gaming partnership where internal and external
considerations contributed to the complexity of the arrangement (as were delineated in
Chapter 3). Despite the fact that issues of complexity were resolved in the negotiations of the
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1995 Agreement, as the partnership continued, new issues emerged and it was essential to
revisit some of the original issues.
In June 2000 challenging new issues surfaced within the corporate accountability
framework of the partnership which were highly influential in the deliberations for a new
agreement. Renegotiations for a new agreement were based on factors that involved
corporate accountability concerns, in addition to the fact that the five-year agreement had
elapsed. The key issues that were negotiated in the agreement can therefore be grouped in
two categories - issues that arose due to deficiencies in the accountability framework, and
issues that required reevaluation due to the evolution of the partnership. In 2002 the
negotiations between the FSIN and the Province culminated with the formulation of a
twenty-five year partnership agreement. Given the salience of this partnership and the public
attention it has received, it is noteworthy that the data and research pertaining to its
accountability challenges and resolutions are limited.
The objective of this chapter is to examine the factors that led to the negotiation of
the 2002 agreement, the focus and nature of the negotiations, and the content of that
agreement. Toward that end, the chapter consists of three sections. The first section examines
the two fundamental factors that gave rise to the 2002 Framework Agreement. The second
section examines the key issues that were on the negotiation table. The third section describes
the product (The 2002 Framework Agreement) that resulted from the negotiations regarding
the accountability concerns in the partnership, and other key issues of the negotiations.
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4.2 The Factors That Led to the Negotiations for a New Agreement
By the year 2000, the gaming partnership had been operational for five years and
generated substantial revenues throughout this period. For instance, in the fiscal year
1998/1999, the net profits from the four First Nations casinos was $17 million, which
resulted in the allocation of $6.4 million to the General Revenue Fund  (Province), $6.4
million to the First Nations Fund, and $4.2 million to the Associated Entities Fund.167  The
partnership was achieving unprecedented levels of success in terms of revenues generated,
yet critical difficulties developed within its corporate accountability controls in June 2000.
These accountability concerns surfaced concurrently with the expiration of the five-year
1995 Framework Agreement. The expiry of that agreement and the accountability concerns
are the two major contributing factors that led to negotiations for a new agreement, namely
the problems with the interim agreement, and the need to examine the corporate
accountability concerns.
4.2.1 The 1995 Agreement Expired
As was discussed in Chapter 3, the partnership involves a contractual, legally
binding, and formal arrangement as endorsement for First Nations casinos operations in the
province. When the 1995 Framework Agreement terminated, the partners agreed to sign an
Amending Agreement to extend the terms of the partnership. This interim agreement was
signed between the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) and the Province of
Saskatchewan in March 2000, and was in effect until December 31, 2000. The Amending
Agreement stipulated five noteworthy provisions that provided direction for the new
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agreement formulated in 2002, while maintaining the legal and regulatory aspects of the
partnership until a new agreement was reached.
During the negotiations, it was agreed to establish, in addition to the Saskatchewan
Indian Gaming Licensing Authority (SIGA), other licensing authorities. These authorities are
referred to as “Gaming Licensing Authorities” and are corporations under The Non-profit
Corporations Act of Saskatchewan. Their purpose is to “monitor and enforce compliance
with the terms and conditions of licenses issued by it….”168 The Amending Agreement stated
that:
 Provisions related to the Community Development Corporation (CDC) are specified
and, are in fact, restated in the 2002 Framework Agreement. The CDC is the operating
body established to distribute the 25percent of net profit share for the on reserve
casinos pursuant to the 1995 Agreement. Its corporate structure, mandate, reporting
procedures, and communication protocols are established in this Amending Agreement.
 It was agreed to provide a second five-year period whereby the Province would not
entertain any other proposal for Saskatoon casino development other than from the
FSIN.
 The Amendment was to be in effect until December 31, 2000 and that “the parties agree
they will use their best efforts to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to reach an
agreement upon a new Framework Agreement prior to December 21, 2000.”169
Regardless of the fact that this interim agreement provided a temporary contractual
arrangement for the partnership until deliberations for a new one were completed,
unanticipated challenges emerged in the partnership in June 2000 that would negate the
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realization of a new agreement by December 2000 as had been stipulated in the interim
agreement.
4.2.2 Corporate Accountability Factors
These accountability factors would prove to be highly influential in the
deliberations for a new agreement, as well as on the provisions of that agreement. There
was one significant allegation of misappropriation of funds by the CEO at Saskatchewan
Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA), which was of particular significance because its
implications caused the suspension of negotiations, and it necessitated a detailed
reevaluation for the partnership arrangement. Additional accountability concerns that were
influential, but to a lesser extent than that of the SIGA Board unauthorized spending, were
allegations that SIGA was providing sponsorships to the New Democrat Party (NDP), and
matters related to accountability in the First Nations Trust Fund. To provide a foundation
on which to examine how these allegations of misappropriation of funds affected the issues
of negotiation, and thus the 2002 Framework Agreement, it is imperative to examine (i) the
nature of accusations, (ii) the Province’s response (including the directives issued), (iii) the
FSIN response to the circumstances, and (iv) SIGA’s responses to the directives.
(i)The nature of the accountability factors.
In June of 2000, during the preliminary stages of the annual audit for SIGA, an
external auditing firm (KPMG) identified questionable expenditure issues. These
expenditures consisted of $360,000 in personal unauthorized debit and credit card
expenditures by the CEO of SIGA. Compounding this issue was the fact that the SIGA
Board authorized a “retroactive salary increase to repay SIGA for these personal
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expenses.”170 Once these discrepancies in the SIGA audit were discovered in preliminary
stage for the fall audit, KPMG immediately contacted the Provincial Auditor, who notified
Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA). Considering these discrepancies,
SLGA requested interviews with FSIN to confirm that information.171 Subsequently, the
Province immediately assembled an auditing team comprised of “a team of fully competent
auditors working in coordination and co-operation with our the Provincial Auditor.”172 The
findings of the team of auditors, specifically the Provincial Auditor’s 2000 Fall Report
revealed the “following improper or questionable use of public money:”
8no support  for payments with the result that we do not know what goods and
                   services SIGA received and whether the payments were for the operation of the slot
    machines;
8unauthorized salary advances;
8travel and accommodation expenses that were not reasonable;
8contracts that were in excess of fair market value; and
8contracts of indeterminable or questionable value.173
Due to these audit evaluations, an expeditious set of actions were called for by the official
opposition, the media and the public.
Aggravating the accountability concerns, were other accusations that surfaced
simultaneously.  In addition to the corporate accountability allegations at SIGA involving
the CEO and the SIGA Board, there were two additional accountability concerns raised.
First, the NDP were under scrutiny by the government opposition and media for receiving
sponsorship monies from SIGA. The issue here was with respect to the $8,000 of
sponsorship donations directed to the NDP; and the $5,000 in donations received by the
Liberal Party, donations which were generated from SIGA over the course of three years.174
The NDP paid back the sponsorship monies in full to SIGA by June 2001, but the Liberals
did not.175 According to the Provincial Auditor’s report, there was a lack of promotion and
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sponsorship policy and procedures, which are required to ensure that expenditures are
legitimate. In other words, the regulatory provisions in the agreement were not sufficient to
produce a credible level of accountability either for business or for sponsorship
expenditures. Ultimately this oversight would give rise to further deliberations and
specifications for a new agreement.
Lastly, regarding the First Nations Trust Fund, accountability concerns were raised
by the official opposition and documented in the Provincial Auditor’s Fall 2000 Report. In
addition, the Provincial Auditor requested access to the private auditor’s (KPMG) files, but
in response the Trustees of the Fund refused to allow the files to be released. A lack of
clarity with respect to jurisdictional authority contributed to these difficulties within the
partnership arrangement. The designated authority of the fund is complicated because it
was the responsibility of the Department of Intergovernmental and Aboriginal Affairs to
supervise the Trustees of the Fund. Consequently, the reporting and jurisdiction travels
beyond the boundaries of the partnership.176 Moreover, the FSIN and Provincial Auditor
have divergent perspectives regarding whether the First Nations Trust Fund is ‘public
money.’ According to the FSIN Grand Chief Bellegarde, the accountability mechanisms
and auditing processes are within the authority of FSIN, and thus they are “answerable to
government as well as their own citizens for all monies received at the First Nations
level.”177 In contrast, the Provincial Auditor claims that the Fund is public money therefore
it has a ‘duty’ to fulfill, a duty that includes mechanisms of public disclosure.178 These
partnership challenges occurred due to a lack of clarity over jurisdictional authority or
responsibility for the First Nations Fund. The accountability concerns for the Fund would
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be addressed in the re-negotiations for the new agreement, with an emphasis on provisions
for the First Nations Trust (the Fund is transformed to the Trust in the 2002 Agreement).
In addition to adding issues to the negotiations for a new agreement, the
accountability matters engendered adverse consequences for the partners, especially for
SIGA, the FSIN agent of the partnership.  For example, the unauthorized expenditures at
the corporate level of SIGA elicited damaging media coverage and condemning remarks
from opposition parties in the legislature. Consequently, the public questioned the
Province’s ability to manage gaming in the province within a credible, transparent
accountability framework. According to opposition member Ms. Eagles, “this scandal has
shaken the confidence of Saskatchewan people. It has shaken the confidence people have in
SIGA.”179 Adding to the adverse consequences for SIGA, was the fact that the Province
suspended negotiations on the new agreement, the stability of the partnership was
jeopardized, and SIGA’s negotiations for a managerial contract with two Manitoba casinos
were dropped.180 The negotiations resumed and the stability of the partnership was
strengthened with SIGA’s commitment to comply with the directives that were instituted.
However, faith in the accountability framework has been shaken, and it required
considerable efforts to restore it.
(ii) The Province’s responses to accountability factors
In response to the allegations of misappropriation of SIGA funds, the Minister
Responsible for the Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority, the Honourable Ms.
Hamilton, instituted four fundamental conditions through SLGA. First, she called for a
suspension on the negotiations for a new agreement, which would remain suspended until
July 2001 when SIGA successfully met eight benchmarks that were issued. Second, as
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noted earlier, an auditing team was assembled to investigate the allegations at SIGA. The
matter was also submitted to the Department of Justice for criminal investigation.181 Third,
approval was cancelled for the proposed SIGA participation as management consultants for
Manitoba First Nations casinos.182 Fourth, the Minister issued two sets of directives to
SIGA, through its agent, SLGA. The initial one was issued in June 2000, and the second in
November 2000.The five directives issued to SIGA’s Board of Directors on June 16, 2000
are as follows:
remove the CEO from his position;
rescind the Board’s resolution dated May 25, 2000 regarding the increase in the CEO’s
salary and extension of his term of office;
appoint a new chair for the Board, who could not hold the position of CEO;
confirm that debit and credit cards issued to executive staff were cancelled; and
provide a copy of the policy governing the use of credit and debit cards for Liquor and
Gaming approval.183
The second set of directives was issued in November 2000 by SLGA to SIGA, is referred
to as the ‘Benchmarks’ for SIGA, and is based upon the Provincial Auditor’s
recommendations. They are summarized as follows:
1) The Provincial Auditor’s office is to have full access to, and the conduct of, SIGA
audits. SIGA is required to publish a public annual report, which should also contain a
business and financial plan.
2) The unauthorized expenses at SIGA are to be recovered by monthly installment
payments until the monies are repaid in full. The Provincial Auditor has estimated these
unreasonable expenses to be at least $811,906, which is a result of illegitimate
expenditures by the CEO of SIGA.184
3) SIGA must adopt new policies for the board pertaining to its structure, conflict of
interest, codes of conduct, remuneration, expense accounting, guidelines and limits for
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travel expenditures, and delegation of authority (these stipulations pertain to
management as well). In addition, the corporate members at SIGA are required to
document and communicate their objectives to management and SLGA.
4) Financial plans, management reporting and communication processes must be
developed for regular reporting amongst the Board and management at SIGA.
5) Appropriate written procedure and standards are required for contracts awarded,
business operations/expenses, management expenses, marketing, promotional and
sponsorship activities.185
In addition to recommendations to improve SIGA’s accountability, the Provincial Auditor
also made recommendations for SLGA to make changes in its operations. Noteworthy
recommendations include the specifications for: scheduled monthly meetings between the
SIGA Board and SLGA, improved training/education for SLGA employees, and SIGA’s
casino operating policies and budgets must be received, assessed and approved “on a timely
basis.”186 The problematic features of 1995 Framework therefore involved a lack of
corporate accountability provisions. For instance, the processes of communication and
information management at the SLGA level were inadequate in terms of its evaluation,
timeliness and responses to the reports generated by SIGA. Factors that may have contributed
to the shortfall in the information analysis and communication specifications are the lack of
partnership experience at SLGA and SIGA, and an underestimation of the time required to
tend to the communication and evaluation aspects of the partnership.
The questionable probity for gaming revenues placed the provincial minister
responsible for gaming in a precarious position.187 There was enormous pressure from the
official opposition and the public to address the circumstances involving the allegations of
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misappropriation of funds SIGA, the sponsorship monies to the NDP, and the responsibility
concerns of the First Nations Fund. Moreover, the Minister was responsible for responding to
the “statutory obligation and legal requirement to regulate gaming in this province.”188
Meanwhile, the gaming industry provides employment for approximately 1,100 people,
seventy percent of which are Aboriginal; thus jeopardizing the industry by closure of the
First Nations casinos would be devastating for the employees of those casinos. Given the
legal and socio-economic implications of the situation, the decision concerning what
appropriate measures were necessary were neither clear nor easy to implement.
In a public announcement, the Minister threatened to close the gaming operations,
and to remove the CEO of SIGA. These sanctions ordered were not necessarily pursuant to
the dispute resolution process specified in Part 7 in the 1995 Framework Agreement, as the
Agreement specifies that “the Government and the FSIN shall consult in good faith to resolve
any dispute that may arise involving the interpretation or application of this Agreement.”189
Moreover, as prescribed in the Agreement, the parties may terminate the Agreement “by
giving written notice of termination to such defaulting party.”190 This procedure was not
followed by the Minister, which contributed to unstable partnership relations during the
controversial crisis. It is conceivable that careful consideration of the provisions of the
agreement, clear communication, and immediate negotiation may have served to alleviate the
high tensions that accompanied the situation. The public threats merely exacerbated the
tensions.
       Stable relations in partnering are very important. However, given the importance of the
accountability issue, remedy for the circumstances was urgently required. What level of
responsibility and liability would the FSIN have taken if the Minister had not insisted upon
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the resignation of the CEO of SIGA? Would the issue have been dealt with more effectively
if partnering relations were conducted with greater respect for their respective authority and
jurisdiction? As a result of the challenges to partnership relations, the dispute resolution was
an issue on the 2002 negotiating agenda, and is reflected in the 2002 Agreement.  In fact, the
2002 Agreement contains eight new provisions that specify the expectations, objectives and
roles of the partners in the mediation and conflict resolution process.
 (iii) FSIN responses to accountability factors
The FSIN Grand Chief Perry Bellegarde expressed concern over the threat issued by
the Minister (Hon. Ms Hamilton) when she stated she had the ability to “pull the plug on
Native-run casinos” if the CEO was not removed at SIGA.191 Initially, Bellegarde repudiated
Hamilton’s request for the removal of the CEO and stated he would remain in the position
with the salary increase that had been approved by FSIN.192 Bellegarde was reported to state
that Hamilton’s directive to remove the CEO of SIGA and the suspension of casino
expansion without FSIN negotiation was an indication of lack of respect for FSIN
jurisdiction.193 Bellegarde also asserted that the media, the Saskatchewan Party and the
provincial government were attempting to “discredit the Indian gaming industry” in a
“political witch hunt.”194 Moreover, he expressed dissatisfaction with the process of dispute
resolution by stating that the FSIN was “very upset with the heavy handedness of the
government” and called for “mutual respect” within the partnership.195
Despite the atmosphere of contention between partners, Bellegarde recognized the
serious implications of non-compliance for Aboriginal people in the gaming industry, and
chose to move forward towards resolution. For example, in a news conference, Bellegarde
announced that the FSIN “through [the] economic and community development commission,
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to which our SIGA board reports, fully accepted and supported the decision from the SIGA
board to terminate the CEO, Dutch Lerat.”196 Bellegarde also declared that the problems with
the CEO occurred because there was “too much power and control in one individual. It was
abuse.”197 The decision to remove the CEO of SIGA was also strongly supported by other
Chiefs in the FSIN. For instance, the nine Chiefs of the Meadow Lake Tribal Council
appealed for the replacement of the entire Board at SIGA, as well as for the firing of the
finance minister for SIGA.198
During the difficulties in 2000, Chief Bellegarde also identified a complex feature of
the partnership that contributed to some of its challenges. That is to say, in the partnership
arrangement the Province is a partner, a competitor (Casino Regina and Moose Jaw Casino),
and a regulator in the gaming industry. 199 Because the Province has these three roles in the
partnership, the regulatory authority or jurisdictional responsibilities may be problematic.
Despite these obvious problems of multiple roles, there was little that could be done to
produce a radically different regulatory or partnering framework. The partners were
constrained to make the best of the situation.
(iv) SIGA’s Responses to Accountability Factors
SIGA complied promptly and efficiently with the directives issued in June and
November 2000. An interim CEO was appointed to replace SIGA’s CEO. The Board
structure was changed, as the board position of chairman and CEO were separated; and the
number of board members decreased from eleven to seven, three of which are SLGA
nominees, and four FSIN nominees.200 In fact, by March 2001, SIGA had successfully
implemented eight of the benchmarks from the November 2000 directives issued by SLGA.
For instance, SIGA’s demonstrated significant progress in executing accountability measures
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for policies, procedures, communication, reporting, and training. Moreover, SIGA
formulated it own Policy & Procedure Manual that provides comprehensive specifications
for its code of conduct, fiduciary duties, director responsibilities, ethical, administrative, and
compliance guidelines.201 The improved level of professionalism of SIGA is, for example,
reflected in the advancements made in its publication of annual reports. By attaining
significant progress on the benchmarks instituted by SLGA, SIGA demonstrated its
commitment to improve its level of professionalism and corporate accountability.
Consequently, negotiations on a new agreement commenced in July 2001.
Throughout the partnership’s difficulties, it became apparent that the 1995
Framework Agreement was deficient in accountability provisions at the corporate level of
SIGA, and in communications and assessment within the partnership. The accountability
provisions were insufficient in the specifications for SIGA’s corporate structure that includes,
for example, conflict of interest and code of conduct provisions, and business procedures and
policies. Shortfalls arose in terms of the information management and evaluation that the
SLGA was responsible for, which can partially be attributed to inadequate communication
procedures and lack of education and managerial skill levels. To reduce these shortfalls in
accountability frameworks, changes must be adopted and implemented. For instance,
improved skills and knowledge are needed to adapt to the partnership approach that uses
information sharing, joint planning, joint communication, and different monitoring,
assessment and adjustment processes.202 These aspects of communication and evaluation are
interconnected in a partnership arrangement, and should be recognized as such.  If
communication and evaluation protocols are lacking, for example, the partners may not take
the opportunity to present, discuss and act jointly upon the evaluations or analysis of reports.
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To facilitate success in a partnership, it is important that the evaluation, decision-making and
adjustment processes are of joint responsibility.203 When these processes are managed
jointly, improvements and adjustments can be implemented in a timely and effective basis,
should difficulties arise in accountability measurements.
In addition, to the accountability issues of the arrangement, there were problems both
with the identification of the partners’ precise responsibilities, and with the dispute resolution
procedures for the partnership. Jurisdictional issues of authority and responsibility amongst
the partners were not clearly specified in the agreement. This became apparent when the
partners attempted to resolve the contentious issue of the misappropriation of funds at SIGA.
When the investigation into the financial allegations was made, the issue was raised - who
was responsible for the probity of financial management of gaming revenues? As a result, of
ambiguity, partnering relations were temporarily strained and unstable.
Fortunately, the FSIN and the Province were cognizant of the substantial socio-
economic loss if the First Nations casinos were closed, and they maintained their
commitment to the partnership. Despite the inadequacies of the agreement, the partnership
was able to move forward in the face of a crisis that temporarily threatened its stability. The
partners implemented adjustments and reevaluated the issues that would sustain the
partnership until a new agreement could be reached. The next section will focus on the key
issues that influenced the nature of the 2002 partnership arrangement.
4.3 Key Issues Negotiated for the 2002 Agreement
In July 2001, negotiations commenced between the Federation of Saskatchewan
Indian Nations (FSIN) and the Province of Saskatchewan to develop a new agreement for the
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gaming partnership. The negotiations had been suspended until SIGA successfully met eight
of the November 2000 Directives.204 The atmosphere of this set of negotiations was one of
optimism by the partners. For example, the Honourable Mr.Ron Osika, the new Minister of
Liquor and Gaming, asserted that “we are negotiating in good faith….and we will have a
good agreement with our partners and our friends.”205 Despite the fact that the partnership
and negotiations are based on ‘mutual respect,’ it is important to keep in mind the Province
yields a higher degree of power than the FSIN (which is not an uncommon phenomenon in
intergovernmental partnerships).206
In summary, the three key issues that were deliberated on for the 2002 Framework
Agreement are the result of the accountability factors that challenged the partnership in June
2000. These are corporate accountability issues, jurisdictional issues, and dispute
resolution/mediation issues. In addition to these key issues on the negotiating table, there
were issues that had been deliberated on in the 1995 Framework Agreement, but required
further consideration due to the evolution the partnership. These issues included the
negotiation of the time commitment to the partnership, the revenue sharing formula, and
casino expansion issues.
The objective of this section of the chapter is to examine the key issues of
negotiation and the resulting provisions within the 2002 partnership arrangement.
Accordingly, it consists of two subsections. The first examines the key issues that emerged in
the year 2000 as a result of the accountability challenges of the partnership; and the second
explores the issues that were reevaluated as a result of the progression of the partnership.
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4.3.1 Key issues that Emerged in 2000 due to Accountability Challenges
The first key issue in negotiations was to agree on accountability provisions that
improved the mechanisms for the “Operating Policies and Directives” and corporate
regulatory provisions. It became apparent through partnership challenges that there were
inadequacies that required attention. These related to auditing procedures, SIGA board
structure, communication, and evaluation processes.207 The 2000 Directives, mandated by the
Province (SLGA) to SIGA in November 2000, addressed the inadequacies of the
accountability mechanisms, and specified corrective policies accordingly. These Directives
are recapitulated in the 2002 Casino Operating Agreement, and will be discussed in further
detail in a later section of this chapter.
The second key issue on the negotiating agenda refers to the jurisdictional aspects
of the partnership. As was mentioned in previous sections, problematic situations emerged in
the partnership due to the ambiguity of jurisdiction as it relates to authority issues and First
Nations inherent rights. The issues to discuss were therefore, threefold. First, what provisions
could be formulated to increase the capacity building aspect of SIGA as an agent of the
partnership? Second, what specifications are needed to address the responsibility and
accountability requirements for the First Nations Trust Fund? Lastly, what regulations are
required to successfully manage the Community Development Corporations, which are
responsible for the allocation of the twenty-five percent of net profits for on reserve casinos?
The discussions on jurisdictional issues regarding the First Nations inherent rights
were a ‘key’ issue for the FSIN. For instance, Grand Chief Bellegarde stated that “we have to
go arm and arm with the province to look at options for jurisdiction to respect and reflect our
First Nations jurisdiction in our territories.”208 The jurisdictional issue of inherent right of
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gaming on reserve was a controversial matter prior to the creation of the gaming partnership,
and in fact it was a fundamental catalyst for the genesis of the partnership. However, the
issue was not completely resolved within the specified provisions of the 1995 Framework
Agreement. Deliberations were therefore focused on resolving the matter, and are seemingly
settled with the ratification of the 2002 Framework Agreement.
The third key issue of negotiations pertains to the dispute resolution and mediation
process. As the stability of the partnership was shaken in 2000, there is no doubt that the
partners would have benefited from clearly specified mediation processes and
responsibilities, and compliance to the stipulations. The partners therefore needed to
deliberate on acceptable terms for mediation and resolution policies and responsibilities. In
so doing, the partners developed an important structure that helps to identify potential risks
for future relations as partners.
 4.3.2 Issues that were Reevaluated due to Evolution of the Partnership
     Because the gaming partnership, like other partnerships, evolved over time and
adjusted to its challenges, issues that were initially agreed upon required reevaluation. The
next section will therefore identify the three key issues in negotiations that necessitated
further consideration.
The first key issue emerged because the agreement had expired in 2000, it was
necessary that the partners establish a new time commitment for the gaming partnership. The
Province and FSIN shared the notion that a long-term commitment provides a “predictable
stable framework” 209 and “long term sustainability for the whole gaming industry in the
province.”210 However, the official opposition raised concerns about the duration of the
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partnership commitment. For instance, leader of the opposition, Mr. Hermanson, stated “[a]
weak leader would sign a 25-year agreement rather than putting forward an agreement of a
reasonable length of time that demands that things be done right so that they can be
successfully renewed.”211 Notwithstanding, Mr. Hermanson’s position, research on
partnerships indicate that long-term commitment is required in many partnerships,
particularly those with objectives to implement solutions for socio-economic challenges such
as unemployment and poverty.212
The second key issue of negotiations for the 2002-partnership arrangement deals
with the revenue sharing formula. Deliberations for a revenue sharing formula may have
been tense, as “revenue sharing is always going to be a sore spot for everybody.”213 The
revenue sharing formula had been amended in 1998, due to the unanticipated high level of
revenues generated, yet further considerations were needed to address additional funding
allocations for capacity building elements, and for social obligations related to gaming.214
Related to capacity building, for example, decisions were required to determine the amounts
to be allocated for (1) budget requirements for a fiscal year at Saskatchewan Indian Gaming
and Licensing operations, and (2) costs associated with the jurisdictional proposal to be
presented to the federal government. Moreover, it was necessary to determine the allocation
of funding for the social responsibilities of gaming - the First Nations Additions and
Rehabilitation Foundation (FNARF).
The third issue on the negotiation agenda was to agree upon a plan for casino
expansion. The issue of casino expansion was on the agenda for deliberations of the 1995
partnering arrangement, but required reevaluation for the 2002 negotiations, as casino
expansion in Saskatoon was an important component in the development strategy for the
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FSIN. Consequently, the negotiations focused on what provisions were required to protect
the partners’ interests. As discussed in a previous chapter, the issue of casino expansion was
related to the issue of the appropriate number of electronic gaming machines in the First
Nations casinos. The next section will discuss the nature of provisions stipulated in the 2002
partnership arrangement.
4.4 The Nature of the Resulting Agreement
The Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) and the Province of
Saskatchewan signed the 2002 Framework Agreement on June 11, 2002. Additionally on that
day, the two agents of the partnership, Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA)
and Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA) signed the 2002 Casino Operating
Agreement. The remainder of this section provides an overview of both the 2002 Framework
Agreement and the 2002 Casino Operating Agreement.
4.4.1 The 2002 Framework Agreement
The provisions instituted in the new 2002 Agreement were a reflection of the key
issues of the negotiations between the FSIN and the Province. As a result of the negotiation
process, there were the existing 1995 provisions that had been expanded upon to meet the
requirements of the negotiation agenda. The five expanded provisions are in relation to
jurisdictional issues, regulatory issues of casino operations, revenue sharing formula
provisions, licensing regulations, and dispute resolution processes. The first part of this
section will identify the five provisions. Additionally, there are three newly constructed
provisions that were formulated for the 2002 agreement. These involve provisions that
stipulate the term of the agreement, the specifications for the ‘survival of provisions’ and
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provisions for the Community Development Corporation and the First Nations Trust. These
three new provisions will be briefly discussed in the second subsection.
1) Jurisdiction. The key provision from the 1995 Agreement relating to jurisdiction remains
as is specified in Part 2.1. The 1995 Agreement stipulated that a committee consisting of
FSIN and Provincial representatives will be established with the objective to develop
discussion papers, proposals and strategies “for taking forward the proposals to the
Government of Canada….”215 In addition, it stipulates that the Parties “shall work together to
further build the capacity of SIGL….”216 The partners’ willingness to collaborate on areas of
enhanced capacity building are demonstrative of level of partnership commitment, and of the
evolutionary process involved in the life cycle of a partnership (devolution of control).
2) Casino Operations. The ceiling that was placed on the electronic gaming machines is
raised to 1,120 from the 500 that was stipulated in the 1995 Agreement. Regulating the
number of electronic gaming machines is an important aspect of the regulatory functions of
SLGA, as a balance in the gaming industry must be maintained to ensure long-term
sustainability in the industry. This section of the agreement also stipulates the procedures
involved for a new proposal for the Saskatoon market. There is also a provision that provides
a three year extension, whereby the Province will not entertain any other proposal for casino
development in Saskatoon except that of the FSIN.
3) Revenue Sharing. The annual net profit distribution remains unchanged from the
amendment of 1998, which specifies that 37.5percent is to the General Revenue Fund,
37.5percent to the First Nations Trust, and 25percent to the Community Development Fund
(on reserve) and 25percent to the Community Initiatives Fund (off reserve). The new
provisions for revenue sharing stipulate the distribution of net profits to the FNARF for the
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sum of $1.5 million, and $250,000 on an annual basis for five fiscal years allocated for costs
associated with the jurisdictional proposal to the federal government, and $725,000 is to be
allocated to SIGL for the fiscal year 2001/02 with $875,000 for the operating budget for the
fiscal year 2002/03.217 In reference to the VLT sites established on reserve, the distribution is
as follows:
                          a)  15% to the Government,
                          b) 15% to the site operator
                          c) 15% to the First Nations where the VLT site is located; and
                          d) 55% to the First Nations Trust218
4) Licensing Regulations. The expanded provisions for the licensing authority to identify the
capacity building processes and regulatory agreements necessary for the designation of a
Gaming Licensing Authority, specifically Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Licensing (SIGL).219
These provisions are building the foundations for an increased role for SIGL, which is an
important step towards a higher degree of First Nations involvement in the regulatory aspect
of gaming.
5) Dispute Resolution Process. Provisions are formulated for a mediation process related to
dispute resolution. These provisions include:
 that an independent assigned mediator shall conduct the process;
 that there are stipulations for appropriate roles of conduct and levels of responsibilities
for the parties;
 that if the mediator does not achieve resolution with the parties, then specifications for
judicial expectations are to be implemented; and
 that “[p]arties will conduct themselves at all times in the utmost good faith in attempting
to resolve any outstanding dispute.”220
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4.4.2 Newly Formulated Provisions of the 2002 Framework Agreement
1) The Term of the Agreement. The term is a twenty-five year term, with review periods of
every five years. Amendments may be implemented providing it is a mutually acceptable
agreement, and that it is in written form and ratified.
2) Survival of Agreement. In the event that the jurisdictional authority to control First
Nations casinos is recognized by the federal government and if the agreement is therefore
terminated, provisions were formulated to address the outcome of that decision. The
provisions that “shall survive the expiration or termination of this Agreement” include the
following:
 the revenue sharing (section 4.1),
 the First Nations Trust indenture (Part 6),
 the provisions relating to the Community Development Corporation,
 the dispute resolution process, and
 the provision that stipulates the Province will not “provide loans or guarantees… and will
not be responsible for any losses incurred through casinos or VLT sites established.”221
These provisions require the FSIN and the Province to ensure that the revenue sharing
formula and its distribution through the CDC and Trust will be maintained.
3) Community Development Corporation (CDC)
The function of the CDC is to “make distributions on a fair and equitable basis amongst First
Nations charities and non- First Nations charities in the communities in which each is located
and in the surrounding areas, in the manner solely determined by the Board of Directors of
each Community Development Corporation.” 222 The four CDCs are incorporated as
charitable organizations pursuant to the Non-profit Corporations Act, and are established by
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the Tribal Council at each First Nations casino. The CDC obtains twenty-five percent of the
annual net profits of the on reserve casinos, and allocates funding in accordance to its
specified mandate. These revenues are to be distributed for initiatives that improve the socio-
economic, justice, education, and health issues in Aboriginal communities; and for the
cultural development, community infrastructure development, and recreational, senior and
youth programming. The specifications for the CDC board structure, the communication
processes within the organization and with the Province, and the auditing requirements are
included in the provisions.
4) First Nations Trust. Part 6 of the agreement was created to address the accountability
concerns of the First Nations Fund. Because the Fund is responsible for the allocation of the
37.5percent of the net revenues of gaming, it is crucial to have specific provisions to ensure
that there are appropriate accountability measures for the Fund. These provisions in part,
speak to the ambiguity of jurisdictional authority problems that surfaced in June 2000. The
lines of responsibility and authority were not clearly delineated for the Fund. Moreover,
there were no provisions to identify roles, responsibilities or accountability specifications
for the Fund. The problem can be partially attributed to the fact that the Trustees reported to
Department of Intergovernmental and Aboriginal Affairs. However, with the provisions in
the 2002 Framework Agreement, the First Nations Fund is dissolved and revenues will flow
to the First Nations Trust. In addition, Appendix “A” was constructed to further augment the
accountability framework for the First Nations Trust.
An agreement was developed (Appendix “A”), in order to formulate a framework to
address the requirements both for the Trustees and for the First Nations Trust. The
provisions of the Appendix “A” specify the following:
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 The purpose of the Trust, which is “to effect the distribution of the monies due to First
Nations from, inter alia, the profits SIGA casinos and SGC casinos.”223
 The revenue distribution purposes for the fund (ie. social programs, justice initiatives,
cultural and spiritual development, etc.).
 The roles and responsibilities of the Trustees. These provisions include the identification
of the Trustees’ power, authority and conflict of interest guidelines; and the training and
communication requirements for Trustees. Moreover, financial accountability procedures
for the Trustees are clearly specified.
 The accountability requirements for the Trust include: the appointment of an independent
auditor, preparation of financial statements “in accordance with generally accepted
accountability principles” and the preparation of an annual report that is to be submitted
to the FSIN and to SLGA or the Province.224
The four new provisions in the agreement resulted largely due to the accountability
challenges that emerged in 2000, and the negotiations that followed. Subsequently,
provisions were formulated for the First Nations Trustees and the Trust, the Community
Development Corporation, the guidelines for ‘surviving’ provisions should the FSIN obtain
gaming jurisdiction, and the time frame of the agreement.  Ultimately, time and whether the
partners comply with the accountability framework will be the determinant of success for the
newly formulated accountability framework.
4.5 The 2002 Casino Operating Agreement.
The 2002 Casino Operating Agreement (COA) provides the comprehensive
regulatory provisions for the agents of the partnership, SLGA and SIGA. Similar to the 2002
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Framework Agreement, the newly developed provisions of the COA are, in large part, due to
the deliberations on key issues of negotiation process. In comparison to the 1995 agreement,
the 2002 COA provides a more precise, in-depth framework with respect to the reporting
mechanisms, budgeting requirements, and capacity building aspects of the partnership. The
purpose of this section is to provide an overview of seven provisions that were constructed
for the regulatory aspects of the partnership’s framework.
1) Operating Policies and Directives. In this section of the COA, the objective was to
strengthen the corporate accountability framework at SIGA. As a result, the ‘November 2000
Directives’ are recapitulated as a provision in Article 6. Additionally, it is stipulated that
SIGA must achieve ‘Compliance’ (refers to 2000 Directives) by August 15, 2005, if not, “it
will constitute a SIGA Event of Default.”225 When SIGA is able to meet all of the 2000
Directives for two consecutive years, SLGA will remove (i) the stipulation of the Provincial
Auditor as SIGA’s external auditor, and (ii) allow for a change in the structure of SIGA
Board of Directors. 226 It is further specified that SLGA will supply SIGA with “regular
written evaluations of the status of SIGA’s Compliance and Sustained Progress.”227 SIGA
will confront major challenges to comply successfully with these new directives.
Nevertheless, to date the organization has attained progress that has been difficult, and is
meeting the challenges with a greater degree of professionalism.
2) Annual Budget. This portion of the agreement is specific, as it provides detailed
expectations and guidelines in reference to the submission of budget, the consultation
process, the amendment and mediation processes for the budget. Additionally, it contains a
provision with respect to the cultural aspect of the partner in that, “the unique First Nations
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aspect of SIGA, including promoting First Nations culture, values and traditions, and that
SIGA may incur associated costs.”228
3) Monthly Reports and Audit Reports. Article Eleven in the COA specifies the roles,
responsibilities, and expectations of the partners with regards to the reporting aspect of the
agents of the partners. For example, SIGA is required to submit reports to SLGA on the
“rules and procedures including board governance and corporate operational policies….”229
The timeframe for the reports to be submitted are also specified.
4) The Steering Committee. The Steering Committee’s consists of two representatives from
both SLGA and SIGA. The key role of the Committee is to “facilitate and co-ordinate
communication between SIGA and SLGA.”230 The committee was established in the 1995
COA, however, the 2002 provision specifies that the representatives must meet at least
quarterly, rather than the previous ‘from time to time.’ SIGL is invited to participate in the
Committee. Because communication is a vital component for the success of a partnership, it
is important to adopt measures that facilitate communication continuity. For instance, in a
contractual relationship, the partners require established communication procedures to ensure
that performance evaluation and adjustments are continually improving.
5) Capacity Building. SLGA and SIGA have agreed to “work together to develop SIGA’s
capacity to operate and manage the Slot Machines and the Central Operating System…”231
The Article contains various additional provisions to ensure the transition for the
responsibilities and operational functions of the Slot Machines and Operating system to
SIGA is successful.
6) Covenants. In addition to the covenants of 1995, which referred to terms such as
maintaining ‘corporate existence’ and status as a charitable organization, SIGA further agrees
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to comply with the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. In so doing, SIGA agrees to
“adopt, maintain and implement board governance and corporate operational policies in all
material respects consistent with the guidelines of Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants.”232 By adopting these guidelines, SIGA demonstrates that it has increased its
transparency, accountability and corporate practices as a professional organization.
7) Dispute Resolution. Similar to the 2002 Framework Agreement, the provisions contained
in this section have added emphasis to its previous specifications on dispute resolution and
mediation processes. The provisions inn the “Events of Default and Termination” do
however, remain the same as specified in the 1995 COA.
The 2002 Casino Operating Agreement is a significant improvement has over its
predecessor by instituting specific regulatory guidelines that serve to enhance the
accountability framework of the partnership. That is not to say, however, that the new
agreement will not require adjustment, amendment and re-evaluation as the partnership
proceeds. The sustainability and credibility of the partnership’s accountability framework is
based upon a process that will require polishing to adapt to the issues that arise in the future.
4.6 Conclusion
The Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) - Province of Saskatchewan
gaming partnership has, since its inception, experienced high levels of success in terms of
revenues generated, and also encountered significant challenges that served to threaten its
stability and credibility as a partnership. The challenges that accounted for the partnership’s
instability and reputation were examined in this chapter. By exploring the allegations of the
misappropriation of funds, and the responses to these accountability concerns, it became
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apparent that there were deficiencies in the accountability framework of the partnership.
These accountability deficiencies include: corporate accountability provisions, the clear
identification of roles and responsibilities of the partners with respect to jurisdictional
authority of the probity of revenues, communication protocols for the SLGA and SIGA, and
evaluation and adjustment procedures. Moreover, inadequate specifications for the mediation
process contributed to the partnership’s instability when the allegations of financial
mismanagement at SIGA were proclaimed.
The accountability accusations that were made in 2000 prompted the Province to
institute specific directives to SIGA to improve the corporate accountability framework. In
response, SIGA demonstrated proficiency in responding to directives and progressed forward
to surmount the challenges it encountered. This demonstrated its commitment to, and
professionalism in, operating within the partnership. Moreover, the partners illustrated their
commitment to the partnership by agreeing to a renegotiation of the agreement process, and
by formulating a new twenty-five year agreement. Throughout the partnership, the Province
and the FSIN have had to deal with some important issues and developments that have
generated important lessons that can be applied to the development of other partnerships
between the Aboriginal and provincial governments as well as among these and other orders
of government. This is particularly true of lessons regarding the accountability framework of
partnership arrangements. The lessons that the FSIN-Province of Saskatchewan gaming
partnership has to offer are discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary of Key Findings
The preceding chapters have addressed four fundamental facets of the gaming
partnership established between the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN)
and Province of Saskatchewan: the genesis of the partnership; the issues of the
negotiation process for the partnership arrangement and the consequential nature of that
partnership framework; the accountability challenges that emerged in the partnership in
2000; and the content of the 2002 agreement. The key findings are summarized below.
The FSIN and the Province considered that the synergistic rewards offered by the
prospect of gaming expansion were significant enough to develop a gaming partnership
in Saskatchewan. There were three shared objectives (economic, social and political) and
two sets of imperatives (ie. jurisdictional and regulatory) that were served by establishing
this gaming partnership. These factors and imperatives are briefly identified in turn.
The FSIN and Province concluded that gaming was a viable economic
development strategy that offered substantial financial gain, which through shared
revenue distribution could benefit the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities in
Saskatchewan. First Nations casino development was perceived as a social initiative
aimed at enhancing human and social capital in Aboriginal communities. This mutual
aim could be realized through the increased employment opportunities for Aboriginal
people, and by designating gaming revenues to foster social development in Aboriginal
communities. The shared aim of promoting Aboriginal self-sufficiency and self-
determination constituted the political objective for the establishment of a gaming
partnership.233
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The jurisdictional issue of gaming on reserve was instrumental in the decision to
create a partnership. Rather than risk having acrimonious relations and a potentially
counterproductive outcome in 1993 when the White Bear reserve opened a casino, the
FSIN and the Province sought a peaceful resolution in a partnering arrangement. Lastly,
the Province was cognizant of the immediate need to develop a ‘gaming strategy’ that
would encompass the regulatory and accountability requirements for a rapidly growing
industry. The Province perceived a partnership as the means to achieve the regulatory
framework it desired. These socio-economic, political, jurisdictional and regulatory
factors provided the partners with the determinants for the development of First Nations
casinos.
The decision to establish a gaming partnership was not without its criticisms.
Indeed, opponents have argued against gaming on socio-economic terms and others on
ethical grounds. However, the opposition did not dissuade the FSIN and the Province
from entering into a partnership.
Once the partners agreed to engage in a collaborative partnership, negotiations
commenced between them to formulate a formalized, contractual arrangement that would
specify the accountability, regulatory, operational and relational terms of the
arrangement. The multitude of complex and multidimensional issues of the partnership
contributed to a protracted negotiation process.234 The major issues requiring conciliation
included jurisdictional considerations, a revenue sharing formula, an appropriate
regulatory framework for gaming that complied with the Criminal Code of Canada, and
on the number and location of First Nations casinos. Eventually these issues as well as
various related issues such as the roles and responsibilities for the ‘agents’ of the
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partnership - Saskatchewan Liquor & Gaming Authority (SLGA) and Saskatchewan
Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA) - were  resolved. The initial round of negotiations
produced arrangements that were included within the first two key documents of the
partnership - the 1995 Framework Agreement and the 1995 Casino Operating Agreement.
The FSIN and the Province signed the key documents for a five-year term. In
March 2000 the term of the agreement expired, and an interim agreement was to be in
effect until December 2000 when a new agreement was to be formulated. However, in
June 2000 with the allegations of misappropriation of funds at the management level of
Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA), the Province responded by suspending
deliberations for a new agreement, and by issuing two sets of directives to SIGA. These
directives were based on the Provincial Auditor’s recommendations that indicated
substantial changes for the corporate structure at SIGA, and focused on improving its
accountability mechanisms (i.e., planning, reporting, communication, and a change in the
conduct of audits). SIGA complied promptly and efficiently with the directives, and thus
demonstrated its commitment to improve accountability in the partnership. SIGA
achieved eight of the specified directives by July 2001, and as a result negotiations for a
new agreement commenced. The accountability challenges that emerged had negative
implications for the partnership; relations between the partners were temporarily
unstable, and the accountability and transparency reputation of the partnership was
damaged. Both the partners and the partnership were facing significant political
problems.
Through the difficulties that the partnership encountered in 2000 it became
apparent that there were deficiencies in the nature of the partnership’s framework,
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particularly with respect to the accountability provisions of the arrangement.
Accountability shortfalls regarding SIGA included specifications for conflict of interest
guidelines, business and sponsorship policies, and codes of conduct for the Board and
organization. Beyond this, the agreement lacked specified provisions on the First Nations
Trust roles and responsibilities, and for the Trust’s overall accountability requirements.
As for the partnering relations between SIGA and SLGA, accountability mechanisms
were inefficient in the areas of the information management, evaluation and
communication protocols. The deficiencies in the framework would become principal
issues in the negotiation process for the formulation of the 2002 agreement.
The content of the new twenty-five year agreement reflects the partners’
deliberations on two sets of key issues, those issues that emerged due to the
accountability problems and those issues that required reevaluation as a result of the
evolution of the partnership. The result of these negotiations was a framework that has
expanded upon key provisions in the 1995 Framework Agreement and included some
news ones. The fortified provisions in the agreement relate to: jurisdictional issues,
regulatory issues of casino operations, revenue sharing provisions, licensing regulations,
dispute resolution processes, capacity building, and regulatory guidelines that enhance
the accountability mechanisms. Additionally, the new agreement included key provisions
for the First Nations Trust and the Community Development Corporation as well as the
so-called ‘survival of provisions’ should the FSIN gain full jurisdiction for on-reserve
gaming activities.
The 2002 Framework Agreement and the 2002 Casino Operating Agreement
incorporate improved provisions for the management, regulatory and accountability
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features of the arrangement. However, the sustainability and success of the gaming
partnership is not only dependent upon the implementation of new provisions; its success
is also contingent on the processes of re-evaluation, re-adjustment, and amendment, all of
which require the partners’ commitment, collaboration and adaptability.
5.2 Assessment of Lessons Learned
In recent years collaborative partnerships have become very important strategic
initiatives for governmental and non-governmental organizations in response to external
forces and influences. The practical reality of collaborative partnerships is that they
encounter a variety of challenges that can compromise their potential for success. The
way that partners in various partnerships deal with such challenges is instructive for other
partnering arrangements. The FSIN – Province of Saskatchewan gaming partnership
provides a case study that exemplifies a partnership that faced crucial challenges, yet was
able to deal with them in a relatively positive and constructive manner to the benefit of
both partners. This section will briefly summarize some of the lessons learned from the
evolution of that partnership from its inception in 1995 to the signing of the 2002
agreement, and particularly in the way that it dealt with what seemed to be not only a
challenge but a crisis.
The FSIN – Province of Saskatchewan gaming partnership provides valuable
lessons, particularly with respect to the importance of accountability frameworks. Among
other things, it underscores the importance of a solid framework agreement, the necessity
of monitoring and evaluating the operations of the partnership, and the need to sustain a
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positive working relationship among the partners. These three dimensions of partnering
are discussed in turn below.
The FSIN-Province gaming partnership reveals that in the initial stages of a
partnership, the partners must negotiate, plan, and design a solid framework that clearly
delineates the roles and responsibilities, procedures, structures and protocols for the
arrangement. The gaming partnership displays that given the complexity involved in
partnerships this is a very difficult task, and that there were shortfalls in the framework
that gave rise to accountability difficulties. It is therefore crucial that in the initial
planning stage the partners do the following matters: articulate the partnership’s
objectives and vision; identify governance issues such as who is responsible for what,
especially if something goes wrong; develop an understanding of the risks and risk
management related to the management of financial and human resources; and develop
clear operating principles and procedures.235  The FSIN - Province of Saskatchewan
gaming partnership serves to illustrate how accountability problems can emerge when the
matters related to the roles and responsibilities of the partners, as well as various
procedures in dealing any problems that may emerge, are not clearly developed as was
evident by the inadequate corporate governance procedures at SIGA.
The FSIN - Province gaming partnership reveals that a solid, written and
formalized framework is the foundation required for a successful partnership. Such an
agreement should institutionalize agreed upon mechanisms for monitoring, evaluating,
and reporting the partnership’s performance.236 To enhance the success of these
mechanisms the monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems must be credible by
ensuring that they provide reliable information. Moreover, the partnership should ensure
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that the “capacity of the partners to monitor performance” and to assess the level of risk
involved in the arrangement is adequate.237
This thesis reveals that the FSIN - Province gaming partnership had difficulties
with monitoring and reporting in the partnership arrangement that created serious
accountability concerns. The Provincial Auditor’s 1997 Fall Report identified the
monitoring inadequacies of the SIGA operations, yet substantial changes to the
mechanisms were not employed until 2000.238 The lesson to be drawn from that
experience is that collaborative, corrective actions should be taken expeditiously to deal
with any accountability problems as they arise. Another lesson is that incorporating a
learning culture into the arrangement is important because it provides the partners,
particularly at the managerial level, with the information to identify and manage such
problems if they occur. Moreover, encouraging a learning culture strengthens skill areas
such as joint monitoring, joint evaluation, management, consultation, consensus building,
negotiation, and an understanding of the ‘other’, all of which are essential in successful
partnering relationships.239
The FSIN – Province gaming partnership reveals that the elements of building and
maintaining partnering relationships are of significant importance to a partnership. These
relations are important because collaborative partnerships are in essence based upon
mutual trust, decision-making, power sharing and cooperation, and without these
elements the partnership cannot be sustained.240 The level of trust has implications for
working relations at all stages in a partnership.241  For instance, initially the level of trust
was damaged with the White Bear incident in 1993, and thus the consultation and
negotiation process was protracted and strained. However, once trust was revitalized with
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the relationship that developed between the FSIN and the Province, the negotiation
process proceeded with much greater efficiency and efficacy.242 This example also
demonstrates another important lesson in partnering, namely that interpersonal relations
are essential for the success of partnerships. There must be a good working relationship
based on high levels of trust and a shared commitment to the partnership.
Another important lesson that can be drawn from the FSIN – Province gaming
partnership is that partners should not underestimate the degree of time, effort,
commitment, and resources required to sustain partnering relations in a collaborative
partnership. It is important to keep in mind that adjustment is required to adapt to the
changes in procedure and practice involved in power sharing, joint decision-making, joint
planning, and communication.  It is also important to keep in mind that by instituting
approaches to build capacity for the less powerful partner or partners, the concept of
power sharing becomes more appealing and lends to the success of the partnership. This
is attributable to the gained sense of trust that occurs when partners the increase their
level of capabilities; the partners are more apt to contribute to the partnership; and risks
can be reduced because the partners assume a greater role in shared responsibility.
Recently, the gaming partnership has been striving to institute capacity building for the
FSIN. For example, the 2002 Casino Operating Agreement formulated a section on
“Capacity Building” that specifies “SLGA and SIGA shall work together to develop
SIGA’s capacity to operate and manage the Slot Machines and Central Operating
System….” 243 Moreover, the FSIN and the Province are formulating a jurisdiction
proposal for the federal government, details of which are specified in the 2002
Framework Agreement. Not only is the proposal an attempt to resolve the issue of
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jurisdiction that emerges throughout the various stages of the partnership, but also
indicates a step towards capacity building for SIGL and its employees.244
The final two lessons from the FSIN - Province gaming partnership are: first that
although collaborative partnerships are complex and challenging, the benefits of a
successful partnership can be substantial; and second that partnerships are dynamic and
evolving and need to be nurtured consistently if they are to be successful over a
substantial length of time.
5.3 Prospects for the Future of the Partnership
It is difficult to predict what the prospects are for the Federation of Saskatchewan
Indian Nations (FSIN) – Province of Saskatchewan gaming partnership. However, there
are at least three indicators that point to a favourable direction for the partnership.  First,
in 2002 the partners signed a twenty-five year agreement that is a positive indication of
the level of confidence, trust and stability that the partnership arrangement has achieved.
Second, the partners are cognizant of the importance of jurisdictional issues involving on
reserve gaming, and have implemented capacity building approaches to ensure that the
regulatory aspects of gaming are dealt with comprehensibly before transfer is
instituted.245 Third, the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA) demonstrates a
progressive trend in its management and operations. For instance, the net revenues
generated for the 2002-03 fiscal year were $29,837,799, which is up eighteen percent
from the previous year.246 SIGA has endeavored to improve its level of professionalism
and accountability since its challenges in 2000. For instance, SIGA has developed a three
year “Strategic Plan” which clearly delineates its objectives related its business plan, its
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“reaffirmation of the SIGA vision, mission, and guiding principles…” and its objectives
for human resources, community relations, and employment development.247 Optimism
for the industry is reflected in a statement made by SIGA CEO Edmund Bellegarde:
 “The future is bright, for SIGA, our stakeholders and the First Nations people of
Saskatchewan. As we continue to search for opportunities to expand into new markets,
we take pride in the accomplishments of the past year. It’s the hard work of a great many
people that we owe our achievements – and we share our success.”248
Additional considerations for the future in Saskatchewan include the questions of
long-term gaming sustainability, and whether or not casino development has reached its
saturation point in the province. Further research is important to determine how and to
what extent First Nations gaming has contributed to the socio-economic development in
Aboriginal communities. Further research is also required to determine whether gaming
has served to enhance nation building, social or human capital in Aboriginal
communities, and if so how. To provide meaningful analysis for other Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal partnerships, it is also valuable to explore the complexity of partnering
relations by examining the informal rules and structures, and discern how these processes
of communication, personal relationships, or leadership are managed in a partnership. It
is also useful to examine how organizations overcome and manage their cultural
differences to facilitate successful relationships. Of course, this is not an exhaustive list
of future direction for research. There are many relevant and important issues related to
gaming, Aboriginal development, and partnerships that must be examined.
There is no denying that the FSIN – Province gaming partnership has received
much attention for its problems of accountability and transparency record in recent years.
This constitutes a blemish on its reputation but does not constitute a catastrophic blow to
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its legitimacy. Those who give undue attention to this blemish overlook the fact that in
many respects it has been a very successful partnership.  One of the most significant
aspects of that success was the manner in which the partners adjusted and adapted to the
challenges it faced during the controversy on financial management practices. The FSIN
and the Province realized the importance of the gaming partnership and were committed
to work together at evaluating and developing partnering approaches to facilitate the
required change. The future of the gaming partnership is highly subject to the ability of
the partners to sustain positive partnering relations, to comply with the accountability
mechanisms, and to successfully manage the partnership’s evolution.
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